TY - JOUR

T1 - The effects of contemporaneous peer punishment on cooperation with the future

AU - Lohse, Johannes

AU - Waichman, Israel

N1 - Funding Information: We thank Johannes Jarke, Rebecca McDonald, Timo Goeschl, and seminar and conference participants at Berlin, Birmingham, Gothenburg, Hamburg, London, and Odense for their useful comments. A generous research grant from the Innovation Fund FRONTIER of Heidelberg University (ZUK 49/2 5.2.141) is gratefully acknowledged. The open access fee was generously paid by the University of Birmingham. Publisher Copyright: © 2020, The Author(s).

PY - 2020/12/1

Y1 - 2020/12/1

N2 - We use a laboratory version of the intergenerational goods game (IGG) to investigate whether peer punishment facilitates the successful provision of multigenerational public goods. In our experiment, groups (generations) decide sequentially about the provision of a multigenerational public good through the voluntary contributions of their members. Successful provision requires that contributions meet a threshold and exclusively benefits members of future generations. Provision costs are borne only by the current generation. We compare a baseline condition without a punishment institution to a treatment condition where peer punishment can be inflicted exclusively on members of the same generation but not on members of past or future generations. We find that without punishment the likelihood of reaching the contribution threshold is low and that making punishment available within a generation is partially successful in sustaining cooperation in a succession of multiple generations.

AB - We use a laboratory version of the intergenerational goods game (IGG) to investigate whether peer punishment facilitates the successful provision of multigenerational public goods. In our experiment, groups (generations) decide sequentially about the provision of a multigenerational public good through the voluntary contributions of their members. Successful provision requires that contributions meet a threshold and exclusively benefits members of future generations. Provision costs are borne only by the current generation. We compare a baseline condition without a punishment institution to a treatment condition where peer punishment can be inflicted exclusively on members of the same generation but not on members of past or future generations. We find that without punishment the likelihood of reaching the contribution threshold is low and that making punishment available within a generation is partially successful in sustaining cooperation in a succession of multiple generations.

KW - Economics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85083544696&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1038/s41467-020-15661-7

DO - 10.1038/s41467-020-15661-7

M3 - Journal articles

C2 - 32286323

AN - SCOPUS:85083544696

VL - 11

JO - Nature Communications

JF - Nature Communications

SN - 2041-1723

IS - 1

M1 - 1815

ER -