Stability under learning of equilibria in financial markets with supply information

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In a recent paper Ganguli/Yang (2009) demonstrate, that there can exist multiple equilibria in a financial market model a' la Grossman/Stiglitz (1980) if traders possess private information regarding the supply of the risky asset. The additional equilibria differ in some important respects from the usual equilibrium of the Grossman-Stiglitz type which still exists in this model. This note shows that these additional equilibria are always unstable under eductive learning (cf. Guesnerie (2002)) and adaptive learning via least-squares estimation (cf. Marcet/Sargent (1988) or Evans/Honkapohja (2001)). Regarding the original Grossman-Stiglitz type equilibrium, the stability results are less clear cut, since this equilibrium might be unstable under eductive learning while it is always stable under adaptive learning.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume30
Issue number1
Pages (from-to)383-391
Number of pages9
ISSN1545-2921
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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