Stability under learning of equilibria in financial markets with supply information
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
Authors
In a recent paper Ganguli/Yang (2009) demonstrate, that there can exist multiple equilibria in a financial market model a' la Grossman/Stiglitz (1980) if traders possess private information regarding the supply of the risky asset. The additional equilibria differ in some important respects from the usual equilibrium of the Grossman-Stiglitz type which still exists in this model. This note shows that these additional equilibria are always unstable under eductive learning (cf. Guesnerie (2002)) and adaptive learning via least-squares estimation (cf. Marcet/Sargent (1988) or Evans/Honkapohja (2001)). Regarding the original Grossman-Stiglitz type equilibrium, the stability results are less clear cut, since this equilibrium might be unstable under eductive learning while it is always stable under adaptive learning.
| Originalsprache | Englisch | 
|---|---|
| Zeitschrift | Economics Bulletin | 
| Jahrgang | 30 | 
| Ausgabenummer | 1 | 
| Seiten (von - bis) | 383-391 | 
| Anzahl der Seiten | 9 | 
| ISSN | 1545-2921 | 
| Publikationsstatus | Erschienen - 2010 | 
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
 
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Volkswirtschaftslehre
 
