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Refunding ETS proceeds to spur the diffusion of renewable energies: An analysis based on the dynamic oligopolistic electricity market model EMELIE

Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review

Standard

Refunding ETS proceeds to spur the diffusion of renewable energies: An analysis based on the dynamic oligopolistic electricity market model EMELIE. / Traber, Thure; Kemfert, Claudia.
In: Utilities Policy, Vol. 19, No. 1, 01.01.2011, p. 33-41.

Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Traber, T & Kemfert, C 2011, 'Refunding ETS proceeds to spur the diffusion of renewable energies: An analysis based on the dynamic oligopolistic electricity market model EMELIE', Utilities Policy, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 33-41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2010.07.002

APA

Traber, T., & Kemfert, C. (2011). Refunding ETS proceeds to spur the diffusion of renewable energies: An analysis based on the dynamic oligopolistic electricity market model EMELIE. Utilities Policy, 19(1), 33-41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2010.07.002

Vancouver

Traber T, Kemfert C. Refunding ETS proceeds to spur the diffusion of renewable energies: An analysis based on the dynamic oligopolistic electricity market model EMELIE. Utilities Policy. 2011 Jan 1;19(1):33-41. doi: 10.1016/j.jup.2010.07.002

Bibtex

@article{2f7ff86cd0ab48e7b17b41d13bce08a6,
title = "Refunding ETS proceeds to spur the diffusion of renewable energies: An analysis based on the dynamic oligopolistic electricity market model EMELIE",
abstract = "We use a quantitative electricity market model to analyze the welfare effects of refunding a share of the emission trading proceeds to support renewable energy technologies that are subject to experience effects. We compare effects of supporting renewable energies under both perfect and oligopolistic competition with competitive fringe firms and emission trading regimes that achieve 70 and 80% emission reductions by 2050. The results indicate the importance of market power for renewable energy support policy. Under imperfect competition welfare improvements is maximized by refunding 10% of the emission trading proceeds, while under perfect competition the optimal refunding share is only 5%. However, under both behavioral assumptions we find significant welfare improvements due to experience effects which are induced by the support for renewable energy.",
keywords = "Economics, Experience effects, Imperfect competition, Emission trading, Renewable energy support",
author = "Thure Traber and Claudia Kemfert",
year = "2011",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jup.2010.07.002",
language = "English",
volume = "19",
pages = "33--41",
journal = "Utilities Policy",
issn = "0957-1787",
publisher = "Elsevier Ltd",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Refunding ETS proceeds to spur the diffusion of renewable energies

T2 - An analysis based on the dynamic oligopolistic electricity market model EMELIE

AU - Traber, Thure

AU - Kemfert, Claudia

PY - 2011/1/1

Y1 - 2011/1/1

N2 - We use a quantitative electricity market model to analyze the welfare effects of refunding a share of the emission trading proceeds to support renewable energy technologies that are subject to experience effects. We compare effects of supporting renewable energies under both perfect and oligopolistic competition with competitive fringe firms and emission trading regimes that achieve 70 and 80% emission reductions by 2050. The results indicate the importance of market power for renewable energy support policy. Under imperfect competition welfare improvements is maximized by refunding 10% of the emission trading proceeds, while under perfect competition the optimal refunding share is only 5%. However, under both behavioral assumptions we find significant welfare improvements due to experience effects which are induced by the support for renewable energy.

AB - We use a quantitative electricity market model to analyze the welfare effects of refunding a share of the emission trading proceeds to support renewable energy technologies that are subject to experience effects. We compare effects of supporting renewable energies under both perfect and oligopolistic competition with competitive fringe firms and emission trading regimes that achieve 70 and 80% emission reductions by 2050. The results indicate the importance of market power for renewable energy support policy. Under imperfect competition welfare improvements is maximized by refunding 10% of the emission trading proceeds, while under perfect competition the optimal refunding share is only 5%. However, under both behavioral assumptions we find significant welfare improvements due to experience effects which are induced by the support for renewable energy.

KW - Economics

KW - Experience effects

KW - Imperfect competition

KW - Emission trading

KW - Renewable energy support

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79251616331&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jup.2010.07.002

DO - 10.1016/j.jup.2010.07.002

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:79251616331

VL - 19

SP - 33

EP - 41

JO - Utilities Policy

JF - Utilities Policy

SN - 0957-1787

IS - 1

ER -

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DOI