TY - JOUR

T1 - Negotiated third party access

T2 - An industrial organisation perspective

AU - Wein, Thomas

AU - Growitsch, Christian

N1 - Funding Information: ∗We thank Maik Heinemann, Joachim Wagner and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and the Lower Saxonian Ministry of Science and Culture for financial support.

PY - 2005/9/1

Y1 - 2005/9/1

N2 - In the course of the liberalization of European energy markets, the German government opted-diverging from all other European countries-for Negotiated Third-Party Access. In this article we analyze if, theoretically, this institutional regime can be superior to regulation. We review empirically whether certain aspects of the actual implementation, in particular publication of the network access charges for each network supplier, facilitated or inhibited competition. In the first place we reconsider previous research, showing that NTPA can-under certain conditions-be economically effective. Our empirical analysis shows that the duty of publishing access charges supported market transparency and imposed a regulatory threat, particularly to suppliers with significantly above-average charges. On the other hand observable price adjustments over time serve as an indicator of tacit collusion. Although the expensive suppliers cut their prices, the cheaper ones raised theirs.

AB - In the course of the liberalization of European energy markets, the German government opted-diverging from all other European countries-for Negotiated Third-Party Access. In this article we analyze if, theoretically, this institutional regime can be superior to regulation. We review empirically whether certain aspects of the actual implementation, in particular publication of the network access charges for each network supplier, facilitated or inhibited competition. In the first place we reconsider previous research, showing that NTPA can-under certain conditions-be economically effective. Our empirical analysis shows that the duty of publishing access charges supported market transparency and imposed a regulatory threat, particularly to suppliers with significantly above-average charges. On the other hand observable price adjustments over time serve as an indicator of tacit collusion. Although the expensive suppliers cut their prices, the cheaper ones raised theirs.

KW - Economics

KW - Wettbewerb

KW - Deregulierung

KW - Vertikale Integration

KW - Deregulation

KW - Tacit collusion

KW - Vertical integration

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=24144472535&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/7cdabdf1-7965-3814-b17b-43a2c25b7a38/

U2 - 10.1007/s10657-005-1735-0

DO - 10.1007/s10657-005-1735-0

M3 - Journal articles

VL - 20

SP - 165

EP - 183

JO - European Journal of Law and Economics

JF - European Journal of Law and Economics

SN - 0929-1261

IS - 2

ER -