Funktions-, anreiz- und aufwandsorientierte Vergütung des Aufsichtsrats und Prüfungsausschusses. Empirische Ausgestaltung des Vergütungssystems im DAX30, MDAX, SDAX und TecDAX

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@article{23abaa1f1ed94e4e9466f54a0cd0a9a4,
title = "Funktions-, anreiz- und aufwandsorientierte Verg{\"u}tung des Aufsichtsrats und Pr{\"u}fungsausschusses.: Empirische Ausgestaltung des Verg{\"u}tungssystems im DAX30, MDAX, SDAX und TecDAX",
abstract = "This research examines the results of the empirical literature on the relationship between non executive board compensation (and audit committees), corporate governance quality, and firm performance. In addition, we tackle a lack of research and investigate the sustainability of compensation systems in an applied two-tier system. Our sample comprises all DAX30, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX listed arms from the business years 2010 to 2015. We derive recommendations for practical and regulatory action to encourage a sustainable compensation of supervisory boards. In contrast to the US-american board system, there is no empirical evidence for the relationship between supervisory board compensation, corporate governance quality, and firm performance for the German two-tier system. Our results show that most firms in our sample do not incentivize their supervisory board and audit committee with a sustainable compensation system.",
keywords = "Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Nachhaltigkeitswissenschaft",
author = "Patrick Velte and Luka Weber",
year = "2019",
language = "Deutsch",
volume = "71",
pages = "214--262",
journal = "Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis",
issn = "0340-5370",
publisher = "NWB Verlag",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Funktions-, anreiz- und aufwandsorientierte Vergütung des Aufsichtsrats und Prüfungsausschusses.

T2 - Empirische Ausgestaltung des Vergütungssystems im DAX30, MDAX, SDAX und TecDAX

AU - Velte, Patrick

AU - Weber, Luka

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - This research examines the results of the empirical literature on the relationship between non executive board compensation (and audit committees), corporate governance quality, and firm performance. In addition, we tackle a lack of research and investigate the sustainability of compensation systems in an applied two-tier system. Our sample comprises all DAX30, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX listed arms from the business years 2010 to 2015. We derive recommendations for practical and regulatory action to encourage a sustainable compensation of supervisory boards. In contrast to the US-american board system, there is no empirical evidence for the relationship between supervisory board compensation, corporate governance quality, and firm performance for the German two-tier system. Our results show that most firms in our sample do not incentivize their supervisory board and audit committee with a sustainable compensation system.

AB - This research examines the results of the empirical literature on the relationship between non executive board compensation (and audit committees), corporate governance quality, and firm performance. In addition, we tackle a lack of research and investigate the sustainability of compensation systems in an applied two-tier system. Our sample comprises all DAX30, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX listed arms from the business years 2010 to 2015. We derive recommendations for practical and regulatory action to encourage a sustainable compensation of supervisory boards. In contrast to the US-american board system, there is no empirical evidence for the relationship between supervisory board compensation, corporate governance quality, and firm performance for the German two-tier system. Our results show that most firms in our sample do not incentivize their supervisory board and audit committee with a sustainable compensation system.

KW - Betriebswirtschaftslehre

KW - Nachhaltigkeitswissenschaft

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85065223493&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Zeitschriftenaufsätze

VL - 71

SP - 214

EP - 262

JO - Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis

JF - Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis

SN - 0340-5370

IS - 2

ER -