Function-, incentive- and expense-related compensation of supervisory boards and audit committees - Empirical Evidence in the German DAX 30, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX

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@article{cffed38b373a47b1bf2a367a804cbbb5,
title = "Function-, incentive- and expense-related compensation of supervisory boards and audit committees - Empirical Evidence in the German DAX 30, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX",
abstract = "This research examines the results of the empirical literature on the relationship between non executive board compensation (and audit committees), corporate governance quality, and firm performance. In addition, we tackle a lack of research and investigate the sustainability of compensation systems in an applied two-tier system. Our sample comprises all DAX30, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX listed firms from the business years 2010 to 2015. We derive recommendations for practical and regulatory action to encourage a sustainable compensation of supervisory boards. In contrast to the US-american board system, there is no empirical evidence for the relationship between supervisory board compensation, corporate governance quality, and firm performance for the German two-tier system. Our results show that most firms in our sample do not incentivize their supervisory board and audit committee with a sustainable compensation system.",
keywords = "Management studies, corporate social-responsibility, director compensation, Balanced Scorecard, CEO compensation, stock-options, agency, Firm, members, determinants, resolution",
author = "Patrick Velte and Weber, {M. A. Luka H. H.}",
year = "2019",
language = "English",
volume = "71",
pages = "214--262",
journal = "Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis",
issn = "0340-5370",
publisher = "NWB Verlag",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Function-, incentive- and expense-related compensation of supervisory boards and audit committees - Empirical Evidence in the German DAX 30, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX

AU - Velte, Patrick

AU - Weber, M. A. Luka H. H.

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - This research examines the results of the empirical literature on the relationship between non executive board compensation (and audit committees), corporate governance quality, and firm performance. In addition, we tackle a lack of research and investigate the sustainability of compensation systems in an applied two-tier system. Our sample comprises all DAX30, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX listed firms from the business years 2010 to 2015. We derive recommendations for practical and regulatory action to encourage a sustainable compensation of supervisory boards. In contrast to the US-american board system, there is no empirical evidence for the relationship between supervisory board compensation, corporate governance quality, and firm performance for the German two-tier system. Our results show that most firms in our sample do not incentivize their supervisory board and audit committee with a sustainable compensation system.

AB - This research examines the results of the empirical literature on the relationship between non executive board compensation (and audit committees), corporate governance quality, and firm performance. In addition, we tackle a lack of research and investigate the sustainability of compensation systems in an applied two-tier system. Our sample comprises all DAX30, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX listed firms from the business years 2010 to 2015. We derive recommendations for practical and regulatory action to encourage a sustainable compensation of supervisory boards. In contrast to the US-american board system, there is no empirical evidence for the relationship between supervisory board compensation, corporate governance quality, and firm performance for the German two-tier system. Our results show that most firms in our sample do not incentivize their supervisory board and audit committee with a sustainable compensation system.

KW - Management studies

KW - corporate social-responsibility

KW - director compensation

KW - Balanced Scorecard

KW - CEO compensation

KW - stock-options

KW - agency

KW - Firm

KW - members

KW - determinants

KW - resolution

M3 - Journal articles

VL - 71

SP - 214

EP - 262

JO - Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis

JF - Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis

SN - 0340-5370

IS - 2

ER -