Function-, incentive- and expense-related compensation of supervisory boards and audit committees - Empirical Evidence in the German DAX 30, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX
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In: Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, Vol. 71, No. 2, 2019, p. 214-262.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Function-, incentive- and expense-related compensation of supervisory boards and audit committees - Empirical Evidence in the German DAX 30, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX
AU - Velte, Patrick
AU - Weber, M. A. Luka H. H.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - This research examines the results of the empirical literature on the relationship between non executive board compensation (and audit committees), corporate governance quality, and firm performance. In addition, we tackle a lack of research and investigate the sustainability of compensation systems in an applied two-tier system. Our sample comprises all DAX30, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX listed firms from the business years 2010 to 2015. We derive recommendations for practical and regulatory action to encourage a sustainable compensation of supervisory boards. In contrast to the US-american board system, there is no empirical evidence for the relationship between supervisory board compensation, corporate governance quality, and firm performance for the German two-tier system. Our results show that most firms in our sample do not incentivize their supervisory board and audit committee with a sustainable compensation system.
AB - This research examines the results of the empirical literature on the relationship between non executive board compensation (and audit committees), corporate governance quality, and firm performance. In addition, we tackle a lack of research and investigate the sustainability of compensation systems in an applied two-tier system. Our sample comprises all DAX30, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX listed firms from the business years 2010 to 2015. We derive recommendations for practical and regulatory action to encourage a sustainable compensation of supervisory boards. In contrast to the US-american board system, there is no empirical evidence for the relationship between supervisory board compensation, corporate governance quality, and firm performance for the German two-tier system. Our results show that most firms in our sample do not incentivize their supervisory board and audit committee with a sustainable compensation system.
KW - Management studies
KW - corporate social-responsibility
KW - director compensation
KW - Balanced Scorecard
KW - CEO compensation
KW - stock-options
KW - agency
KW - Firm
KW - members
KW - determinants
KW - resolution
M3 - Journal articles
VL - 71
SP - 214
EP - 262
JO - Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis
JF - Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis
SN - 0340-5370
IS - 2
ER -