Das Wahlsystem zwischen normativer Begründung, empirischer Evidenz und politischen Interessen
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
Standard
Das Wahlsystem zwischen normativer Begründung, empirischer Evidenz und politischen Interessen. / Behnke, Joachim; Grotz, Florian.
In: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2011, p. 426-432.Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
Harvard
APA
Vancouver
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - Das Wahlsystem zwischen normativer Begründung, empirischer Evidenz und politischen Interessen
AU - Behnke, Joachim
AU - Grotz, Florian
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - To eliminate the "negative weight of votes" effect of the German electoral system, Pappi and Herrmann have recommended a reform model in which the Länder party lists are detached from each other and the seats for each party list are allocated separately. However, this suggestion is not suitable for several reasons. First of all, the Pappi-Herrmann model would not eliminate the essentially problematic effect of the current electoral system, i.e. the emergence of surplus seats. These seats cannot be considered a desirable "majority bonus" for constitutional reasons. Furthermore, the argument that surplus seats favor those government coalitions that have been announced by the respective parties before the polls proves to be untenable for empirical reasons. Surplus seats may rather reverse earned majorities of other party coalitions and thereby undermine the legitimating function of parliamentary elections. Viable reform options include a reduced share of single-member districts or the introduction of two-member districts, complemented by compensation seats for the other parties. In so doing, the "negative weight of votes" effect and the emergence of surplus seats could be eliminated at the same time.
AB - To eliminate the "negative weight of votes" effect of the German electoral system, Pappi and Herrmann have recommended a reform model in which the Länder party lists are detached from each other and the seats for each party list are allocated separately. However, this suggestion is not suitable for several reasons. First of all, the Pappi-Herrmann model would not eliminate the essentially problematic effect of the current electoral system, i.e. the emergence of surplus seats. These seats cannot be considered a desirable "majority bonus" for constitutional reasons. Furthermore, the argument that surplus seats favor those government coalitions that have been announced by the respective parties before the polls proves to be untenable for empirical reasons. Surplus seats may rather reverse earned majorities of other party coalitions and thereby undermine the legitimating function of parliamentary elections. Viable reform options include a reduced share of single-member districts or the introduction of two-member districts, complemented by compensation seats for the other parties. In so doing, the "negative weight of votes" effect and the emergence of surplus seats could be eliminated at the same time.
KW - Politikwissenschaft
U2 - 10.5771/0340-1758-2011-2-419
DO - 10.5771/0340-1758-2011-2-419
M3 - Zeitschriftenaufsätze
VL - 42
SP - 426
EP - 432
JO - Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen
JF - Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen
SN - 0340-1758
IS - 2
ER -