Corporate Governance after the Death of the King: The Origins of the Separation of Powers in Companies
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
Standard
In: European Company and Financial Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 4, 15.12.2011, p. 476-488.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
Harvard
APA
Vancouver
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - Corporate Governance after the Death of the King
T2 - The Origins of the Separation of Powers in Companies
AU - Schall, Alexander
PY - 2011/12/15
Y1 - 2011/12/15
N2 - The separation of power in companies can be traced back to the sovereignty of the Kings. It first entered the stage with the chartered companies like the British East India Company. Their governance structure was based on the dualism of private investors and governors installed by the monarch. Companies survived the rise of democracy and demise of monarchy ensuing the age of enlightenment. They rose to glory in the modern world. Large listed companies are still are managed by independent entrepreneurial officers. But who took the place of the good king watching over them? The fall of the thrones left a vacuum here. This lies at the bottom of the debate on shareholder vs. stakeholder supremacy. If we understand history, we might see new ways to answer for whose benefit the company should be governed.
AB - The separation of power in companies can be traced back to the sovereignty of the Kings. It first entered the stage with the chartered companies like the British East India Company. Their governance structure was based on the dualism of private investors and governors installed by the monarch. Companies survived the rise of democracy and demise of monarchy ensuing the age of enlightenment. They rose to glory in the modern world. Large listed companies are still are managed by independent entrepreneurial officers. But who took the place of the good king watching over them? The fall of the thrones left a vacuum here. This lies at the bottom of the debate on shareholder vs. stakeholder supremacy. If we understand history, we might see new ways to answer for whose benefit the company should be governed.
KW - Law
U2 - 10.1515/ECFR.2011.476
DO - 10.1515/ECFR.2011.476
M3 - Journal articles
VL - 8
SP - 476
EP - 488
JO - European Company and Financial Law Review
JF - European Company and Financial Law Review
SN - 1613-2548
IS - 4
ER -