Altruism as a thick concept

Research output: Journal contributionsJournal articlesResearchpeer-review

Standard

Altruism as a thick concept. / Schefczyk, Michael; Peacock, Mark.
In: Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 26, No. 2, 07.2010, p. 165-187.

Research output: Journal contributionsJournal articlesResearchpeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Schefczyk M, Peacock M. Altruism as a thick concept. Economics and Philosophy. 2010 Jul;26(2):165-187. doi: 10.1017/S0266267110000180

Bibtex

@article{04bbfaa5dca44b7aad9cba6d9fb0c736,
title = "Altruism as a thick concept",
abstract = "In this paper, we examine different forms of altruism. We commence by analysing the behavioural definition and, after clarifying its conditions for altruism, we argue that it is not in reflective equilibrium with everyday linguistic usage of the term. We therefore consider a psychological definition, which we likewise refine, and argue that it better reflects ordinary language use. Both behavioural and psychological approaches define altruism descriptively and thus fail to capture an important aspect of altruism, namely its normative component. Altruism, we argue, is a thick concept, i.e. one which embodies both positive and normative components. We discuss and compare various formulations of this normative component.",
keywords = "Business psychology",
author = "Michael Schefczyk and Mark Peacock",
year = "2010",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1017/S0266267110000180",
language = "English",
volume = "26",
pages = "165--187",
journal = "Economics and Philosophy",
issn = "0266-2671",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Altruism as a thick concept

AU - Schefczyk, Michael

AU - Peacock, Mark

PY - 2010/7

Y1 - 2010/7

N2 - In this paper, we examine different forms of altruism. We commence by analysing the behavioural definition and, after clarifying its conditions for altruism, we argue that it is not in reflective equilibrium with everyday linguistic usage of the term. We therefore consider a psychological definition, which we likewise refine, and argue that it better reflects ordinary language use. Both behavioural and psychological approaches define altruism descriptively and thus fail to capture an important aspect of altruism, namely its normative component. Altruism, we argue, is a thick concept, i.e. one which embodies both positive and normative components. We discuss and compare various formulations of this normative component.

AB - In this paper, we examine different forms of altruism. We commence by analysing the behavioural definition and, after clarifying its conditions for altruism, we argue that it is not in reflective equilibrium with everyday linguistic usage of the term. We therefore consider a psychological definition, which we likewise refine, and argue that it better reflects ordinary language use. Both behavioural and psychological approaches define altruism descriptively and thus fail to capture an important aspect of altruism, namely its normative component. Altruism, we argue, is a thick concept, i.e. one which embodies both positive and normative components. We discuss and compare various formulations of this normative component.

KW - Business psychology

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=78650093227&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/S0266267110000180

DO - 10.1017/S0266267110000180

M3 - Journal articles

VL - 26

SP - 165

EP - 187

JO - Economics and Philosophy

JF - Economics and Philosophy

SN - 0266-2671

IS - 2

ER -