Autocracies' Counterintuitive Delegation Preferences to International Human Rights Organizations

Project: Dissertation project

Project participants


Autocracies sustain their power due to human rights violations. Therefore, autocracies would not be expected to delegate authority to human rights international organizations that reveal human rights abuses and contribute to democratization processes. I observe, however, that some autocracies support even the highest level of authority delegation. Namely, they decide to delegate authority to human rights monitoring bureaucracies instead of shutting them down. To solve this puzzle, I ask: “Under what conditions prefer autocracies to delegate authority to international human rights organizations?” I argue that if autocracies have managed to impose monitoring missions on their rival states, then autocracies should prefer to delegate authority to monitoring bureaucracies. To assess the argument, I aim to apply mixed methods approach. The quantitative analysis will provide for significance tests, probability values and will control for competing explanatory factors. The qualitative part will employ qualitative comparisons in order to make sense of the regressions and to explain authority delegation preferences in detail.

Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Vera van Hüllen; Prof. Dr. Stephanie Hofmann

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