The Effect of Market Power on Electricity Storage Utilization: The Case of Pumped Hydro Storage in Germany

Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und BerichteArbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere

Standard

The Effect of Market Power on Electricity Storage Utilization: The Case of Pumped Hydro Storage in Germany. / Schill, Wolf-Peter; Kemfert, Claudia.
Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), 2010. (DIW Discussion Papers; Nr. 947).

Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und BerichteArbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere

Harvard

Schill, W-P & Kemfert, C 2010 'The Effect of Market Power on Electricity Storage Utilization: The Case of Pumped Hydro Storage in Germany' DIW Discussion Papers, Nr. 947, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin. <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/201403>

APA

Schill, W.-P., & Kemfert, C. (2010). The Effect of Market Power on Electricity Storage Utilization: The Case of Pumped Hydro Storage in Germany. (DIW Discussion Papers; Nr. 947). Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW). http://hdl.handle.net/10419/201403

Vancouver

Schill WP, Kemfert C. The Effect of Market Power on Electricity Storage Utilization: The Case of Pumped Hydro Storage in Germany. Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW). 2010. (DIW Discussion Papers; 947).

Bibtex

@techreport{f2d5ca2923014a899c88a15c8f1ff9d9,
title = "The Effect of Market Power on Electricity Storage Utilization: The Case of Pumped Hydro Storage in Germany",
abstract = "We develop a game-theoretic electricity market model that allows analyzing strategic electricity storage in an imperfect market setting. We apply the model to Germany and examine different cases of strategic and non-strategic pumped hydro storage operation. We find that introducing storage generally smoothes conventional generation patterns and market prices and increases consumer rent and overall welfare. In contrast, electricity producers generally suffer from storage. We also find that the utilization of storage capacities depends on their operator's ability to exert market power both regarding storage and conventional generation. In particular, strategic operators tend to under-utilize their storage capacities, which in turn has welfare implications. The distribution of storage among players also matters. Accordingly, economic regulation of existing and future storage capacities may be necessary.",
keywords = "Economics, Electric Power Markets, Storage, Market Power, Nash-Cournot",
author = "Wolf-Peter Schill and Claudia Kemfert",
year = "2010",
language = "English",
series = "DIW Discussion Papers",
publisher = "Deutsches Institut f{\"u}r Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)",
number = "947",
address = "Germany",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Deutsches Institut f{\"u}r Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - The Effect of Market Power on Electricity Storage Utilization

T2 - The Case of Pumped Hydro Storage in Germany

AU - Schill, Wolf-Peter

AU - Kemfert, Claudia

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - We develop a game-theoretic electricity market model that allows analyzing strategic electricity storage in an imperfect market setting. We apply the model to Germany and examine different cases of strategic and non-strategic pumped hydro storage operation. We find that introducing storage generally smoothes conventional generation patterns and market prices and increases consumer rent and overall welfare. In contrast, electricity producers generally suffer from storage. We also find that the utilization of storage capacities depends on their operator's ability to exert market power both regarding storage and conventional generation. In particular, strategic operators tend to under-utilize their storage capacities, which in turn has welfare implications. The distribution of storage among players also matters. Accordingly, economic regulation of existing and future storage capacities may be necessary.

AB - We develop a game-theoretic electricity market model that allows analyzing strategic electricity storage in an imperfect market setting. We apply the model to Germany and examine different cases of strategic and non-strategic pumped hydro storage operation. We find that introducing storage generally smoothes conventional generation patterns and market prices and increases consumer rent and overall welfare. In contrast, electricity producers generally suffer from storage. We also find that the utilization of storage capacities depends on their operator's ability to exert market power both regarding storage and conventional generation. In particular, strategic operators tend to under-utilize their storage capacities, which in turn has welfare implications. The distribution of storage among players also matters. Accordingly, economic regulation of existing and future storage capacities may be necessary.

KW - Economics

KW - Electric Power Markets

KW - Storage

KW - Market Power

KW - Nash-Cournot

M3 - Working papers

T3 - DIW Discussion Papers

BT - The Effect of Market Power on Electricity Storage Utilization

PB - Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

CY - Berlin

ER -

Links