The Contemplative Conditions of a Moral Action
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The Contemplative Conditions of a Moral Action. / Schües, Christina.
The Other: Feminist Reflections in Ethics. Hrsg. / H. Fielding; G. Hiltmann; D. Olkowski; A. Reichold. Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. S. 227 - 245.Publikation: Beiträge in Sammelwerken › Kapitel › begutachtet
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TY - CHAP
T1 - The Contemplative Conditions of a Moral Action
AU - Schües, Christina
PY - 2007/4/25
Y1 - 2007/4/25
N2 - In the history of philosophy, praxis or action have, for the most part, been applied within an ethical context. Aristotle differentiates poiësis (constructing, making) from praxis and particularly opposes the latter to theoria. He distinguishes action motivated by appetite, emotion and wish, and actions motivated by rationality (Aristotle, 1111b–1113b). This distinction among motives follows Immanuel Kant in his Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, since actions can be carried out for all sorts of reasons such as feelings, inclinations or their consequences. The Aristotelian explanation is that the person who acts morally is habituated in accordance with moral rules that she/he has internalized. By contrast, on the Kantian view, a person decides how to act out of duty, and in accordance with the question of ‘what shall I do?’; yet, this question cannot be answered if one is inclined to act morally in accordance with feelings or interests only. Moral actions should be performed, in Kant’s analysis, only according to a generalized and universal moral law, that is, the categorical imperative. Hence, Kant’s transcendental method is not interested in how human beings really act, but only in the principal foundations of a moral action.
AB - In the history of philosophy, praxis or action have, for the most part, been applied within an ethical context. Aristotle differentiates poiësis (constructing, making) from praxis and particularly opposes the latter to theoria. He distinguishes action motivated by appetite, emotion and wish, and actions motivated by rationality (Aristotle, 1111b–1113b). This distinction among motives follows Immanuel Kant in his Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, since actions can be carried out for all sorts of reasons such as feelings, inclinations or their consequences. The Aristotelian explanation is that the person who acts morally is habituated in accordance with moral rules that she/he has internalized. By contrast, on the Kantian view, a person decides how to act out of duty, and in accordance with the question of ‘what shall I do?’; yet, this question cannot be answered if one is inclined to act morally in accordance with feelings or interests only. Moral actions should be performed, in Kant’s analysis, only according to a generalized and universal moral law, that is, the categorical imperative. Hence, Kant’s transcendental method is not interested in how human beings really act, but only in the principal foundations of a moral action.
KW - Philosophy
KW - Human relation
KW - Moral action
KW - Moral Rule
KW - Moral Consideration
KW - Moral thinking
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85016364581&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/2d70e45f-21a1-328d-b662-a14fe4a86ea9/
U2 - 10.1057/9780230206434_10
DO - 10.1057/9780230206434_10
M3 - Chapter
SN - 0-230-50687-9
SN - 978-0-230-50687-9
SP - 227
EP - 245
BT - The Other
A2 - Fielding, H.
A2 - Hiltmann, G.
A2 - Olkowski, D.
A2 - Reichold, A.
PB - Palgrave Macmillan
CY - Basingstoke
ER -