Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)
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Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012). / Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012); Bouwmeester, Samantha; Verkoeijen, Peter P. J. L. et al.
in: Perspectives on Psychological Science, Jahrgang 12, Nr. 3, 01.05.2017, S. 527-542.Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)
AU - Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)
AU - Bouwmeester, Samantha
AU - Verkoeijen, Peter P. J. L.
AU - Aczel, B.
AU - Barbosa, F.
AU - Bègue, L.
AU - Brañas-Garza, P.
AU - Chmura, T. G. H.
AU - Cornelissen, G.
AU - Døssing, F. S.
AU - Espín, A. M.
AU - Evans, A. M.
AU - Ferreira-Santos, F.
AU - Fiedler, S.
AU - Flegr, J.
AU - Ghaffari, M.
AU - Glöckner, A.
AU - Goeschl, T.
AU - Guo, L.
AU - Hauser, O. P.
AU - Hernan-Gonzalez, R.
AU - Herrero, A.
AU - Horne, Z.
AU - Houdek, P.
AU - Johannesson, M.
AU - Koppel, L.
AU - Kujal, P.
AU - Laine, T.
AU - Lohse, Johannes
AU - Martins, E. C.
AU - Mauro, C.
AU - Mischkowski, D.
AU - Mukherjee, S.
AU - Myrseth, K. O. R.
AU - Navarro-Martínez, D.
AU - Neal, T. M. S.
AU - Novakova, J.
AU - Pagà, R.
AU - Paiva, T. O.
AU - Palfi, B.
AU - Piovesan, M.
AU - Rahal, R.-M.
AU - Salomon, E.
AU - Srinivasan, N.
AU - Srivastava, A.
AU - Szaszi, B.
AU - Szollosi, A.
AU - Thor, K. Ø.
AU - Tinghög, G.
AU - Trueblood, J. S.
AU - Bavel, J. J. Van
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2017, © The Author(s) 2017.
PY - 2017/5/1
Y1 - 2017/5/1
N2 - In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.
AB - In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.
KW - Economics
KW - cooperation
KW - social heuristic hypothesis
KW - economic games
KW - social psychology
KW - replication
KW - decision making
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85019734453&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/07374fba-b543-3249-9e84-40387ebc84c4/
U2 - 10.1177/1745691617693624
DO - 10.1177/1745691617693624
M3 - Journal articles
VL - 12
SP - 527
EP - 542
JO - Perspectives on Psychological Science
JF - Perspectives on Psychological Science
SN - 1745-6916
IS - 3
ER -