Four Charges Against the WTO: Some Remarks on Peter Singer geistigen Eigentums
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
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in: Analyse & Kritik , Jahrgang 25, Nr. 2, 01.01.2003, S. 275-284.
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Four Charges Against the WTO
T2 - Some Remarks on Peter Singer geistigen Eigentums
AU - Schefczyk, Michael
PY - 2003/1/1
Y1 - 2003/1/1
N2 - The article distinguishes two models of self-realization. The independence model claims that self-realization is compatible with leading a non-moral life, whereas the dependence model argues the converse. Hegel′s influential version of the dependence model aims at showing why and how self-realization must be embedded in a complex structure of reasonable social relations. I argue that Hegel′s dependence model abrogates the „Recht der Besonderheit, sich befriedigt zu finden” and is thus not convincing. What I call Hegel′s “inofficial theory”, however, concedes an infusible conflict between modernity and self-realization; philosophy has to reconcile the individual with the impossibility of being a „ganzer Mensch” in modern societies. After an interlude with Michael Theunissen′s indpendence model, I turn to T. H. Green′s theory of self-realization. Green provides a richer explanatory story than Hegel as to why other-regarding acts contribute to self-realization; however, this story leaves not enough conceptual room for interpersonal conflict and is vulnerable to similar objections to Hegel′s account.
AB - The article distinguishes two models of self-realization. The independence model claims that self-realization is compatible with leading a non-moral life, whereas the dependence model argues the converse. Hegel′s influential version of the dependence model aims at showing why and how self-realization must be embedded in a complex structure of reasonable social relations. I argue that Hegel′s dependence model abrogates the „Recht der Besonderheit, sich befriedigt zu finden” and is thus not convincing. What I call Hegel′s “inofficial theory”, however, concedes an infusible conflict between modernity and self-realization; philosophy has to reconcile the individual with the impossibility of being a „ganzer Mensch” in modern societies. After an interlude with Michael Theunissen′s indpendence model, I turn to T. H. Green′s theory of self-realization. Green provides a richer explanatory story than Hegel as to why other-regarding acts contribute to self-realization; however, this story leaves not enough conceptual room for interpersonal conflict and is vulnerable to similar objections to Hegel′s account.
KW - Philosophy
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/919b3f89-6933-3d08-b833-142be1677bbf/
U2 - 10.1515/auk-2003-0209
DO - 10.1515/auk-2003-0209
M3 - Journal articles
VL - 25
SP - 275
EP - 284
JO - Analyse & Kritik
JF - Analyse & Kritik
SN - 0171-5860
IS - 2
ER -