'Duty to act' and 'commission by omission' in international criminal law
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Übersichtsarbeiten › Forschung
Standard
in: International Criminal Law Review, Jahrgang 10, Nr. 5, 01.10.2010, S. 619-646.
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Übersichtsarbeiten › Forschung
Harvard
APA
Vancouver
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - 'Duty to act' and 'commission by omission' in international criminal law
AU - Berster, Lars C.
PY - 2010/10/1
Y1 - 2010/10/1
N2 - Whether a general rule on omission exists in international criminal law has long been fraught with controversy. It has recently met with increasing acceptance, most prominently by the ICTY Appeals Chamber's judgement of 5 May 2009 (Prosecutor v. Mrkšić et al.). In view of the likely further consolidation of the law, this study deals with the material requirements of 'commission by omission' more comprehensively. It tests several possible ways to give meaning to the offender's duty to prevent the incriminated action, as the 'duty to act' is widely seen as the key to criminal liability for omission. In particular, the present article challenges the prevailing trend in international case law and scholarship to derive individual duties to act from duties under international humanitarian law or domestic law. The alternative approach put forward herein is to derive duties to act genuinely from international criminal law. This is done by extending the 'principle of control', which according to ICC case law constitutes the underlying base for 'commission by action', to the sphere of omission. There, the overarching criterion of control can be broken down into a set of clear-cut duties to act and thus be reconciled with the requirements of legal certainty. Eventually, it is shown that pursuant to the present approach 'commission by omission', albeit not explicitly contemplated by the ICC Statute, falls within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
AB - Whether a general rule on omission exists in international criminal law has long been fraught with controversy. It has recently met with increasing acceptance, most prominently by the ICTY Appeals Chamber's judgement of 5 May 2009 (Prosecutor v. Mrkšić et al.). In view of the likely further consolidation of the law, this study deals with the material requirements of 'commission by omission' more comprehensively. It tests several possible ways to give meaning to the offender's duty to prevent the incriminated action, as the 'duty to act' is widely seen as the key to criminal liability for omission. In particular, the present article challenges the prevailing trend in international case law and scholarship to derive individual duties to act from duties under international humanitarian law or domestic law. The alternative approach put forward herein is to derive duties to act genuinely from international criminal law. This is done by extending the 'principle of control', which according to ICC case law constitutes the underlying base for 'commission by action', to the sphere of omission. There, the overarching criterion of control can be broken down into a set of clear-cut duties to act and thus be reconciled with the requirements of legal certainty. Eventually, it is shown that pursuant to the present approach 'commission by omission', albeit not explicitly contemplated by the ICC Statute, falls within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
KW - commission by omission
KW - concept of control
KW - duty to act
KW - individual criminal responsibility
KW - Law
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=78149298537&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/71836942-40d2-3300-8305-83b5b7098ad6/
U2 - 10.1163/157181210X527046
DO - 10.1163/157181210X527046
M3 - Scientific review articles
AN - SCOPUS:78149298537
VL - 10
SP - 619
EP - 646
JO - International Criminal Law Review
JF - International Criminal Law Review
SN - 1567-536X
IS - 5
ER -