Coming to work while sick: An economic theory of presenteeism with an application to German data

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Coming to work while sick: An economic theory of presenteeism with an application to German data. / Hirsch, Boris; Lechmann, Daniel; Schnabel, Claus.
in: Oxford Economic Papers, Jahrgang 69, Nr. 4, 01.10.2017, S. 1010-1031.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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@article{b0c21c592b1441ca89633cb24c700c06,
title = "Coming to work while sick: An economic theory of presenteeism with an application to German data",
abstract = "Presenteeism, i.e. attending work while sick, is widespread and associated with significant costs. Still, economic analyses of this phenomenon are rare. In a theoretical model, we show that presenteeism arises due to differences between workers in the disutility from workplace attendance. As these differences are unobservable by employers, they set wages that incentivize sick workers to attend work. Using a large representative German data set, we test several hypotheses derived from our model. In line with our predictions, we find that stressful working conditions and bad health status are positively related to presenteeism. Better dismissal protection, captured by higher tenure, is associated with slightly fewer presenteeism days, whereas the role of productivity and skills is inconclusive. {\textcopyright} Oxford University Press 2017 All rights reserved.",
keywords = "Economics",
author = "Boris Hirsch and Daniel Lechmann and Claus Schnabel",
year = "2017",
month = oct,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1093/oep/gpx016",
language = "English",
volume = "69",
pages = "1010--1031",
journal = "Oxford Economic Papers",
issn = "0030-7653",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Coming to work while sick

T2 - An economic theory of presenteeism with an application to German data

AU - Hirsch, Boris

AU - Lechmann, Daniel

AU - Schnabel, Claus

PY - 2017/10/1

Y1 - 2017/10/1

N2 - Presenteeism, i.e. attending work while sick, is widespread and associated with significant costs. Still, economic analyses of this phenomenon are rare. In a theoretical model, we show that presenteeism arises due to differences between workers in the disutility from workplace attendance. As these differences are unobservable by employers, they set wages that incentivize sick workers to attend work. Using a large representative German data set, we test several hypotheses derived from our model. In line with our predictions, we find that stressful working conditions and bad health status are positively related to presenteeism. Better dismissal protection, captured by higher tenure, is associated with slightly fewer presenteeism days, whereas the role of productivity and skills is inconclusive. © Oxford University Press 2017 All rights reserved.

AB - Presenteeism, i.e. attending work while sick, is widespread and associated with significant costs. Still, economic analyses of this phenomenon are rare. In a theoretical model, we show that presenteeism arises due to differences between workers in the disutility from workplace attendance. As these differences are unobservable by employers, they set wages that incentivize sick workers to attend work. Using a large representative German data set, we test several hypotheses derived from our model. In line with our predictions, we find that stressful working conditions and bad health status are positively related to presenteeism. Better dismissal protection, captured by higher tenure, is associated with slightly fewer presenteeism days, whereas the role of productivity and skills is inconclusive. © Oxford University Press 2017 All rights reserved.

KW - Economics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85031712379&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/oep/gpx016

DO - 10.1093/oep/gpx016

M3 - Journal articles

VL - 69

SP - 1010

EP - 1031

JO - Oxford Economic Papers

JF - Oxford Economic Papers

SN - 0030-7653

IS - 4

ER -

DOI