Trade-offs between justices, economics, and efficiency
Research output: Working paper › Working papers
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Lüneburg: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, 2011. (Working Paper Series in Economics; No. 218).
Research output: Working paper › Working papers
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Trade-offs between justices, economics, and efficiency
AU - Baumgärtner, Stefan
AU - Glotzbach, Stefanie
AU - Hoberg, Nikolai
AU - Quaas, Martin F.
AU - Stumpf, Klara Helene
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - We argue that economics – as the scientific method of analyzing trade-offs – canbe helpful (and may even be indispensable) for assessing the trade-off betweenintergenerational and intragenerational justice. Economic analysis can delineate the “opportunity set” of politics with respect to the two normative objectives of inter- and intragenerational justice, i.e. it can describe which outcomes are feasible in achieving the two objectives in a given context, and which are not. It can distinguish efficient from inefficient uses of instruments of justice. It can identify the “opportunity cost” of attaining one justice to a higher degree, in terms of less achievement of the other. We find that, under very general conditions, (1) efficiency in the use of instruments of justice implies that thereis rivalry between the two justices and the opportunity cost of either justice is positive; (2) negative opportunity costs of achieving one justice exist if there is facilitation between the two justices, which can only happen if instruments of justice are used inefficiently; (3) in outcomes of inefficient uses of instruments of justice in the interior of the opportunity set, the two justices are independent of each other and the opportunity cost of either justice is zero.
AB - We argue that economics – as the scientific method of analyzing trade-offs – canbe helpful (and may even be indispensable) for assessing the trade-off betweenintergenerational and intragenerational justice. Economic analysis can delineate the “opportunity set” of politics with respect to the two normative objectives of inter- and intragenerational justice, i.e. it can describe which outcomes are feasible in achieving the two objectives in a given context, and which are not. It can distinguish efficient from inefficient uses of instruments of justice. It can identify the “opportunity cost” of attaining one justice to a higher degree, in terms of less achievement of the other. We find that, under very general conditions, (1) efficiency in the use of instruments of justice implies that thereis rivalry between the two justices and the opportunity cost of either justice is positive; (2) negative opportunity costs of achieving one justice exist if there is facilitation between the two justices, which can only happen if instruments of justice are used inefficiently; (3) in outcomes of inefficient uses of instruments of justice in the interior of the opportunity set, the two justices are independent of each other and the opportunity cost of either justice is zero.
KW - Sustainability sciences, Management & Economics
KW - economics
KW - efficiency
KW - intragenerational and intergenerational justice
KW - normative objectives
KW - opportunity set
KW - opportunity cost
KW - scarce resources
KW - economics
KW - efficiency
KW - intragenerational and intergenerational justice
KW - normative objectives
KW - opportunity set
KW - opportunity cost
KW - scarce ressources
KW - Economics
KW - economics
KW - efficiency
KW - intragenerational and intergenerational justice
KW - normative objectives
KW - opportunity set
KW - opportunity cost
KW - scarce resources
M3 - Working papers
T3 - Working Paper Series in Economics
BT - Trade-offs between justices, economics, and efficiency
PB - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg
CY - Lüneburg
ER -