The rise and decline of regional power: A historical case-study of privilege seeking
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In: Public Choice, Vol. 80, No. 3-4, 01.09.1994, p. 381-403.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The rise and decline of regional power
T2 - A historical case-study of privilege seeking
AU - Waldow, Karl Heinz
PY - 1994/9/1
Y1 - 1994/9/1
N2 - This paper comprises one of Olson's findings about the rise and decline of nations and Tullock's idea of privilege-seeking. In the historical framework of Northern Europe the history of a town being closely linked with its saltern is investigated. It is shown that throughout the centuries rent- and privilege-seeking dominated. This was primarily done to avoid competition and, finally, to get excessive revenues. The sovereigns' production-costs of the privileges were low and Tullock's results of an efficient transfer mechanism are confirmed. Additionally, the findings of coalition-forming and mortgaging support the inevitable sclerotic process. Market activities find their political counterparts which is illustrated by the building and destroying of specific coalitions. A typical delay of privilege- and coalition-seeking is observed depending on the economic and political success. Regulatory measures are explored then "exploited", and allies are found, "utilized" and dropped, finally leaving certified rents of no value. © 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
AB - This paper comprises one of Olson's findings about the rise and decline of nations and Tullock's idea of privilege-seeking. In the historical framework of Northern Europe the history of a town being closely linked with its saltern is investigated. It is shown that throughout the centuries rent- and privilege-seeking dominated. This was primarily done to avoid competition and, finally, to get excessive revenues. The sovereigns' production-costs of the privileges were low and Tullock's results of an efficient transfer mechanism are confirmed. Additionally, the findings of coalition-forming and mortgaging support the inevitable sclerotic process. Market activities find their political counterparts which is illustrated by the building and destroying of specific coalitions. A typical delay of privilege- and coalition-seeking is observed depending on the economic and political success. Regulatory measures are explored then "exploited", and allies are found, "utilized" and dropped, finally leaving certified rents of no value. © 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
KW - Management studies
KW - public finance
KW - transfer mechanism
KW - efficient transfer
KW - market activity
KW - regulator measure
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34248253981&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/61d136b3-4aa9-3cd2-9f92-e77bcf07fe49/
U2 - 10.1007/BF01053228
DO - 10.1007/BF01053228
M3 - Journal articles
AN - SCOPUS:34248253981
VL - 80
SP - 381
EP - 403
JO - Public Choice
JF - Public Choice
SN - 0048-5829
IS - 3-4
ER -