The rise and decline of regional power: A historical case-study of privilege seeking

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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The rise and decline of regional power: A historical case-study of privilege seeking. / Waldow, Karl Heinz.
in: Public Choice, Jahrgang 80, Nr. 3-4, 01.09.1994, S. 381-403.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Waldow KH. The rise and decline of regional power: A historical case-study of privilege seeking. Public Choice. 1994 Sep 1;80(3-4):381-403. doi: 10.1007/BF01053228

Bibtex

@article{fc7c26a873ae41e3a94ac829f16cffc7,
title = "The rise and decline of regional power: A historical case-study of privilege seeking",
abstract = "This paper comprises one of Olson's findings about the rise and decline of nations and Tullock's idea of privilege-seeking. In the historical framework of Northern Europe the history of a town being closely linked with its saltern is investigated. It is shown that throughout the centuries rent- and privilege-seeking dominated. This was primarily done to avoid competition and, finally, to get excessive revenues. The sovereigns' production-costs of the privileges were low and Tullock's results of an efficient transfer mechanism are confirmed. Additionally, the findings of coalition-forming and mortgaging support the inevitable sclerotic process. Market activities find their political counterparts which is illustrated by the building and destroying of specific coalitions. A typical delay of privilege- and coalition-seeking is observed depending on the economic and political success. Regulatory measures are explored then {"}exploited{"}, and allies are found, {"}utilized{"} and dropped, finally leaving certified rents of no value. {\textcopyright} 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers.",
keywords = "Management studies, public finance, transfer mechanism, efficient transfer, market activity, regulator measure",
author = "Waldow, {Karl Heinz}",
year = "1994",
month = sep,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/BF01053228",
language = "English",
volume = "80",
pages = "381--403",
journal = "Public Choice",
issn = "0048-5829",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "3-4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The rise and decline of regional power

T2 - A historical case-study of privilege seeking

AU - Waldow, Karl Heinz

PY - 1994/9/1

Y1 - 1994/9/1

N2 - This paper comprises one of Olson's findings about the rise and decline of nations and Tullock's idea of privilege-seeking. In the historical framework of Northern Europe the history of a town being closely linked with its saltern is investigated. It is shown that throughout the centuries rent- and privilege-seeking dominated. This was primarily done to avoid competition and, finally, to get excessive revenues. The sovereigns' production-costs of the privileges were low and Tullock's results of an efficient transfer mechanism are confirmed. Additionally, the findings of coalition-forming and mortgaging support the inevitable sclerotic process. Market activities find their political counterparts which is illustrated by the building and destroying of specific coalitions. A typical delay of privilege- and coalition-seeking is observed depending on the economic and political success. Regulatory measures are explored then "exploited", and allies are found, "utilized" and dropped, finally leaving certified rents of no value. © 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

AB - This paper comprises one of Olson's findings about the rise and decline of nations and Tullock's idea of privilege-seeking. In the historical framework of Northern Europe the history of a town being closely linked with its saltern is investigated. It is shown that throughout the centuries rent- and privilege-seeking dominated. This was primarily done to avoid competition and, finally, to get excessive revenues. The sovereigns' production-costs of the privileges were low and Tullock's results of an efficient transfer mechanism are confirmed. Additionally, the findings of coalition-forming and mortgaging support the inevitable sclerotic process. Market activities find their political counterparts which is illustrated by the building and destroying of specific coalitions. A typical delay of privilege- and coalition-seeking is observed depending on the economic and political success. Regulatory measures are explored then "exploited", and allies are found, "utilized" and dropped, finally leaving certified rents of no value. © 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

KW - Management studies

KW - public finance

KW - transfer mechanism

KW - efficient transfer

KW - market activity

KW - regulator measure

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34248253981&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/61d136b3-4aa9-3cd2-9f92-e77bcf07fe49/

U2 - 10.1007/BF01053228

DO - 10.1007/BF01053228

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:34248253981

VL - 80

SP - 381

EP - 403

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

SN - 0048-5829

IS - 3-4

ER -

DOI