Supply-side and demand-side cost sharing in deregulated social health insurance: which is more effective?

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Supply-side and demand-side cost sharing in deregulated social health insurance: which is more effective? / Trottmann, Maria; Zweifel, Peter; Beck, Konstantin.
In: Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 31, No. 1, 01.01.2012, p. 231-242.

Research output: Journal contributionsJournal articlesResearchpeer-review

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@article{28bcb650b3c14a738b229772a26e3bf3,
title = "Supply-side and demand-side cost sharing in deregulated social health insurance: which is more effective?",
abstract = "Microeconomic theory predicts that if patients are fully insured and providers are paid fee-for-service, utilization of medical services exceeds the efficient level ('moral hazard effect'). In Switzerland, both demand-side and supply-side cost sharing have been introduced to mitigate this problem. Analyzing a panel dataset of about 160,000 adults, we find both types of cost sharing to be effective in curtailing the use of medical services. However, when moral hazard mitigation is traded off against risk selection, the minimum-deductible, supply-side cost sharing option ranks first, followed by the medium-deductible demand-side alternative, making the supply-side option somewhat more effective.",
keywords = "Adult, Aged, Cost Sharing, Deductibles and Coinsurance, Fee-for-Service Plans, Female, Health Services Needs and Demand, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Program Evaluation, Social Security, Switzerland, Management studies",
author = "Maria Trottmann and Peter Zweifel and Konstantin Beck",
note = "Copyright {\textcopyright} 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",
year = "2012",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.10.004",
language = "English",
volume = "31",
pages = "231--242",
journal = "Journal of Health Economics",
issn = "0167-6296",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Supply-side and demand-side cost sharing in deregulated social health insurance

T2 - which is more effective?

AU - Trottmann, Maria

AU - Zweifel, Peter

AU - Beck, Konstantin

N1 - Copyright © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

PY - 2012/1/1

Y1 - 2012/1/1

N2 - Microeconomic theory predicts that if patients are fully insured and providers are paid fee-for-service, utilization of medical services exceeds the efficient level ('moral hazard effect'). In Switzerland, both demand-side and supply-side cost sharing have been introduced to mitigate this problem. Analyzing a panel dataset of about 160,000 adults, we find both types of cost sharing to be effective in curtailing the use of medical services. However, when moral hazard mitigation is traded off against risk selection, the minimum-deductible, supply-side cost sharing option ranks first, followed by the medium-deductible demand-side alternative, making the supply-side option somewhat more effective.

AB - Microeconomic theory predicts that if patients are fully insured and providers are paid fee-for-service, utilization of medical services exceeds the efficient level ('moral hazard effect'). In Switzerland, both demand-side and supply-side cost sharing have been introduced to mitigate this problem. Analyzing a panel dataset of about 160,000 adults, we find both types of cost sharing to be effective in curtailing the use of medical services. However, when moral hazard mitigation is traded off against risk selection, the minimum-deductible, supply-side cost sharing option ranks first, followed by the medium-deductible demand-side alternative, making the supply-side option somewhat more effective.

KW - Adult

KW - Aged

KW - Cost Sharing

KW - Deductibles and Coinsurance

KW - Fee-for-Service Plans

KW - Female

KW - Health Services Needs and Demand

KW - Humans

KW - Male

KW - Middle Aged

KW - Program Evaluation

KW - Social Security

KW - Switzerland

KW - Management studies

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84858075411&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.10.004

DO - 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.10.004

M3 - Journal articles

C2 - 22105043

VL - 31

SP - 231

EP - 242

JO - Journal of Health Economics

JF - Journal of Health Economics

SN - 0167-6296

IS - 1

ER -