Natural vs. financial insurances in the management of public good ecosystems

Research output: Working paperWorking papers

Standard

Natural vs. financial insurances in the management of public good ecosystems. / Quaas, Martin; Baumgärtner, Stefan.
Lüneburg: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, 2006. (Working paper series in economics; No. 34).

Research output: Working paperWorking papers

Harvard

Quaas, M & Baumgärtner, S 2006 'Natural vs. financial insurances in the management of public good ecosystems' Working paper series in economics, no. 34, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, Lüneburg.

APA

Quaas, M., & Baumgärtner, S. (2006). Natural vs. financial insurances in the management of public good ecosystems. (Working paper series in economics; No. 34). Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg.

Vancouver

Quaas M, Baumgärtner S. Natural vs. financial insurances in the management of public good ecosystems. Lüneburg: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg. 2006. (Working paper series in economics; 34).

Bibtex

@techreport{566c954057c54c29a328f87f8788072e,
title = "Natural vs. financial insurances in the management of public good ecosystems",
abstract = "In the face of uncertainty, ecosystems can provide natural insurance to risk averse users of ecosystem services. We employ a conceptual ecological-economic model to analyze the allocation of (endogenous) risk and ecosystem quality by risk averse ecosystem managers who have access to financial insurances, and study the implications for individually and socially optimal ecosystem management, and policy design. We show that while an improved access to financial insurance leads to lower ecosystem quality, the effect on the free-rider problem and on welfare is determined by ecosystem properties. We derive conditions on ecosystem functioning under which, if financial insurance becomes more accessible, (i) the extent of optimal regulation increases or decreases; and (ii) welfare, in the absence of environmental regulation, increases or decreases.",
keywords = "Sustainability sciences, Management & Economics, ecosystem quality, ecosystem services, ecosystem management, Endogenous environmental risk, insurance, risk-aversion, uncertainty",
author = "Martin Quaas and Stefan Baumg{\"a}rtner",
note = "Literaturverz. S. 16 - 19",
year = "2006",
language = "English",
series = "Working paper series in economics",
publisher = "Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universit{\"a}t L{\"u}neburg",
number = "34",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universit{\"a}t L{\"u}neburg",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Natural vs. financial insurances in the management of public good ecosystems

AU - Quaas, Martin

AU - Baumgärtner, Stefan

N1 - Literaturverz. S. 16 - 19

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - In the face of uncertainty, ecosystems can provide natural insurance to risk averse users of ecosystem services. We employ a conceptual ecological-economic model to analyze the allocation of (endogenous) risk and ecosystem quality by risk averse ecosystem managers who have access to financial insurances, and study the implications for individually and socially optimal ecosystem management, and policy design. We show that while an improved access to financial insurance leads to lower ecosystem quality, the effect on the free-rider problem and on welfare is determined by ecosystem properties. We derive conditions on ecosystem functioning under which, if financial insurance becomes more accessible, (i) the extent of optimal regulation increases or decreases; and (ii) welfare, in the absence of environmental regulation, increases or decreases.

AB - In the face of uncertainty, ecosystems can provide natural insurance to risk averse users of ecosystem services. We employ a conceptual ecological-economic model to analyze the allocation of (endogenous) risk and ecosystem quality by risk averse ecosystem managers who have access to financial insurances, and study the implications for individually and socially optimal ecosystem management, and policy design. We show that while an improved access to financial insurance leads to lower ecosystem quality, the effect on the free-rider problem and on welfare is determined by ecosystem properties. We derive conditions on ecosystem functioning under which, if financial insurance becomes more accessible, (i) the extent of optimal regulation increases or decreases; and (ii) welfare, in the absence of environmental regulation, increases or decreases.

KW - Sustainability sciences, Management & Economics

KW - ecosystem quality

KW - ecosystem services

KW - ecosystem management

KW - Endogenous environmental risk

KW - insurance

KW - risk-aversion

KW - uncertainty

M3 - Working papers

T3 - Working paper series in economics

BT - Natural vs. financial insurances in the management of public good ecosystems

PB - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg

CY - Lüneburg

ER -

Documents