Natural vs. financial insurance in the management of public-good ecosystems
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In: Ecological Economics, Vol. 65, No. 2, 01.04.2008, p. 397-406.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Natural vs. financial insurance in the management of public-good ecosystems
AU - Quaas, Martin F.
AU - Baumgärtner, Stefan
PY - 2008/4/1
Y1 - 2008/4/1
N2 - In the face of uncertainty, ecosystems can provide natural insurance to risk averse users of ecosystem services. We employ a conceptual ecological-economic model in which ecosystem management has a private insurance value and, through ecosystem processes at higher hierarchical levels, generates a positive externality on other ecosystem users. We analyze the allocation of (endogenous) risk and ecosystem quality by risk averse ecosystem managers who have access to financial insurance, and study the implications for individually and socially optimal ecosystem management, and policy design. We show that while an improved access to financial insurance leads to lower ecosystem quality, the effect on the extent of the public-good problem and on welfare is determined by ecosystem properties. We derive conditions on ecosystem functioning under which, if financial insurance becomes more accessible, (i) the extent of optimal regulation increases or decreases; and (ii) welfare, in the absence of environmental regulation, increases or decreases.
AB - In the face of uncertainty, ecosystems can provide natural insurance to risk averse users of ecosystem services. We employ a conceptual ecological-economic model in which ecosystem management has a private insurance value and, through ecosystem processes at higher hierarchical levels, generates a positive externality on other ecosystem users. We analyze the allocation of (endogenous) risk and ecosystem quality by risk averse ecosystem managers who have access to financial insurance, and study the implications for individually and socially optimal ecosystem management, and policy design. We show that while an improved access to financial insurance leads to lower ecosystem quality, the effect on the extent of the public-good problem and on welfare is determined by ecosystem properties. We derive conditions on ecosystem functioning under which, if financial insurance becomes more accessible, (i) the extent of optimal regulation increases or decreases; and (ii) welfare, in the absence of environmental regulation, increases or decreases.
KW - Sustainability sciences, Management & Economics
KW - Ecosystem services
KW - Ecosystem management
KW - Endogenous environmental risk
KW - Insurance
KW - Multi-scale ecosystem functioning
KW - Risk aversion
KW - uncertainty
KW - Economics
KW - Ecosystem services
KW - Ecosystem management
KW - Endogenous environmental risk
KW - Insurance
KW - Multi-scale ecosystem functioning
KW - Risk aversion
KW - uncertainty
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=39449116669&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.004
DO - 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.004
M3 - Journal articles
VL - 65
SP - 397
EP - 406
JO - Ecological Economics
JF - Ecological Economics
SN - 0921-8009
IS - 2
ER -