Rebound effects can reduce planned environmental savings considerably if they are not known, accounted for and managed. Environmental activities only contribute effectively to reducing environmental impacts if rebound effects that diminish the intended improvements remain small. Research has so far focused on macroeconomic analyses and shows that rebound effects can be highly relevant on the level of industries and economies. While widespread agreement exists that rebound effects are an important phenomenon that needs to be better understood when managing environmental protection activities, little is however known about mechanisms that explicate the emergence of rebounds in companies and what consequences can be drawn for accounting and management to prevent or reduce them at the corporate level. To address this gap, this paper problematizes the underlying assumption of an automatic and almost inevitable formation of rebounds by investigating how rebound effects emerge from mechanisms, including decisions and actions within companies. Our conceptual analysis contributes to accounting research and practice by asking how rebound effects could be considered, prevented, or even transformed into outcomes that increase the intended environmental improvement, i.e. reinforcement effects. The study shows that rebound and reinforcement effects are not inevitable but that their emergence is subject to accounting and management decisions.