TY - UNPB

T1 - Easier in than out

T2 - the protracted process of ending sanctions

AU - Attia, Hana

AU - Grauvogel, Julia

PY - 2019/10

Y1 - 2019/10

N2 - With the proliferation of sanctions after the end of the Cold War, sanctions termination has also become a ubiquitous phenomenon. Of the 292 sanctions cases since 1990, around 85 per cent had been lifted as of 2018. Purportedly unsuccessful sanctions – such as the European Union’s restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine – often provoke intense political debate about their potential removal. Less than half of imposed sanctions end with some degree of target compliance. For example, trade and financial restrictions imposed on Iran over its nuclear programme were lifted after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action significantly restricted the country’s levels of uranium enrichment. In contrast, the EU resumed development aid to Sudan even though the regime remained notorious for its human rights violations. Policymakers must thus regularly decide whether to hold onto measures that do not lead to a policy change or to capitulate and lift them. These considerations are not only influenced by rational, cost–benefit analyses. Instead, sanctions termination is a volatile and often inconclusive process shaped by multiple social interactions between senders and targets as well as their diverse logics of action. The removal of sanctions signals the end of the targeted regime’s visible international isolation. Such a symbolic act can be heavily contested, as controversies over the relaxation of United States sanctions against Cuba exemplify. Decisions regarding the design of sanctions during their imposition phase affect the eventual termination process. Some sanctions regimes contain revision provisions, expiry dates, and precise termination requirements, which ensures the regular assessment of the measures’ continued political usefulnessPolicy ImplicationsIt is much easier to impose sanctions than it is to end them. Unsuccessful sanctions pose a policy dilemma. Lifting such measures despite their failure to achieve the stated goals may harm the sender’s reputation as committed sanctioners, but keeping trade or financial restrictions in place is also costly. A gradual easing of external pressure with the help of clear and feasible milestones can incentivise incremental change in target countries.

AB - With the proliferation of sanctions after the end of the Cold War, sanctions termination has also become a ubiquitous phenomenon. Of the 292 sanctions cases since 1990, around 85 per cent had been lifted as of 2018. Purportedly unsuccessful sanctions – such as the European Union’s restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine – often provoke intense political debate about their potential removal. Less than half of imposed sanctions end with some degree of target compliance. For example, trade and financial restrictions imposed on Iran over its nuclear programme were lifted after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action significantly restricted the country’s levels of uranium enrichment. In contrast, the EU resumed development aid to Sudan even though the regime remained notorious for its human rights violations. Policymakers must thus regularly decide whether to hold onto measures that do not lead to a policy change or to capitulate and lift them. These considerations are not only influenced by rational, cost–benefit analyses. Instead, sanctions termination is a volatile and often inconclusive process shaped by multiple social interactions between senders and targets as well as their diverse logics of action. The removal of sanctions signals the end of the targeted regime’s visible international isolation. Such a symbolic act can be heavily contested, as controversies over the relaxation of United States sanctions against Cuba exemplify. Decisions regarding the design of sanctions during their imposition phase affect the eventual termination process. Some sanctions regimes contain revision provisions, expiry dates, and precise termination requirements, which ensures the regular assessment of the measures’ continued political usefulnessPolicy ImplicationsIt is much easier to impose sanctions than it is to end them. Unsuccessful sanctions pose a policy dilemma. Lifting such measures despite their failure to achieve the stated goals may harm the sender’s reputation as committed sanctioners, but keeping trade or financial restrictions in place is also costly. A gradual easing of external pressure with the help of clear and feasible milestones can incentivise incremental change in target countries.

KW - Sanktion

KW - Wirtschaftssanktion

KW - Völkerrecht

KW - Ursache

KW - Erde

KW - Politics

M3 - Working papers

T3 - GIGA Focus Global

BT - Easier in than out

PB - Institute of Asian Studies at the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies

CY - Hamburg

ER -