Dictators don't compete: autocracy, democracy, and tax competition

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Dictators don't compete: autocracy, democracy, and tax competition. / Genschel, Philipp; Lierse, Hanna; Seelkopf, Laura.
In: Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 23, No. 2, 03.03.2016, p. 290-315.

Research output: Journal contributionsJournal articlesResearchpeer-review

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Genschel P, Lierse H, Seelkopf L. Dictators don't compete: autocracy, democracy, and tax competition. Review of International Political Economy. 2016 Mar 3;23(2):290-315. doi: 10.1080/09692290.2016.1152995

Bibtex

@article{8aa4acc1e5184e7ab566de1d173d6442,
title = "Dictators don't compete: autocracy, democracy, and tax competition",
abstract = "It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic, more than a third of countries worldwide are non-democratic. We explain theoretically why autocracies are less likely to adjust to competitive constraints and test our argument empirically against data on the corporate tax policy of 99 countries from 1999 to 2011.",
keywords = "autocracy, corporate Taxation, democracy, globalization, tax Competition, tax policy-making, Sustainability sciences, Management & Economics",
author = "Philipp Genschel and Hanna Lierse and Laura Seelkopf",
year = "2016",
month = mar,
day = "3",
doi = "10.1080/09692290.2016.1152995",
language = "English",
volume = "23",
pages = "290--315",
journal = "Review of International Political Economy",
issn = "0969-2290",
publisher = "Routledge Taylor & Francis Group",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Dictators don't compete

T2 - autocracy, democracy, and tax competition

AU - Genschel, Philipp

AU - Lierse, Hanna

AU - Seelkopf, Laura

PY - 2016/3/3

Y1 - 2016/3/3

N2 - It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic, more than a third of countries worldwide are non-democratic. We explain theoretically why autocracies are less likely to adjust to competitive constraints and test our argument empirically against data on the corporate tax policy of 99 countries from 1999 to 2011.

AB - It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic, more than a third of countries worldwide are non-democratic. We explain theoretically why autocracies are less likely to adjust to competitive constraints and test our argument empirically against data on the corporate tax policy of 99 countries from 1999 to 2011.

KW - autocracy

KW - corporate Taxation

KW - democracy

KW - globalization

KW - tax Competition

KW - tax policy-making

KW - Sustainability sciences, Management & Economics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84964555622&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/09692290.2016.1152995

DO - 10.1080/09692290.2016.1152995

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:84964555622

VL - 23

SP - 290

EP - 315

JO - Review of International Political Economy

JF - Review of International Political Economy

SN - 0969-2290

IS - 2

ER -

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