Climate Policy Cooperation Games between Developed and Developing Nations: A Quantitative, Applied Analysis
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Climate Policy Cooperation Games between Developed and Developing Nations : A Quantitative, Applied Analysis. / Kemfert, Claudia.
The Coupling of Climate and Economic Dynamics: Essays on Integrated Assessment. ed. / Alain Haurie; Laurent Viguier. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2005. p. 145-171.Research output: Contributions to collected editions/works › Chapter › peer-review
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TY - CHAP
T1 - Climate Policy Cooperation Games between Developed and Developing Nations
T2 - A Quantitative, Applied Analysis
AU - Kemfert, Claudia
PY - 2005/1/1
Y1 - 2005/1/1
N2 - This paper investigates climate control coalition games of developed and developing nations. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased RD expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries to join a climate control coalition if nations cooperate on technological innovations. Restrictions on trade such as sanction mechanisms against non-cooperating countries are not necessarily an incentive to join a coalition. Technological spillover effects lead to improved economic situations and increased energy efficiencies in non-cooperating countries. We compare climate control coalitions of developed and developing nations. Developing nations can benefit by climate control if it is linked with technology cooperation.
AB - This paper investigates climate control coalition games of developed and developing nations. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased RD expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries to join a climate control coalition if nations cooperate on technological innovations. Restrictions on trade such as sanction mechanisms against non-cooperating countries are not necessarily an incentive to join a coalition. Technological spillover effects lead to improved economic situations and increased energy efficiencies in non-cooperating countries. We compare climate control coalitions of developed and developing nations. Developing nations can benefit by climate control if it is linked with technology cooperation.
KW - Economics
KW - Emission Reduction
KW - Emission Trading
KW - Trade Barrier
KW - Climate Control
KW - Emission Permit
U2 - 10.1007/1-4020-3425-3_6
DO - 10.1007/1-4020-3425-3_6
M3 - Chapter
SN - 978-90-481-6861-3
SP - 145
EP - 171
BT - The Coupling of Climate and Economic Dynamics
A2 - Haurie, Alain
A2 - Viguier, Laurent
PB - Springer Netherlands
CY - Dordrecht
ER -