Climate Policy Cooperation Games between Developed and Developing Nations: A Quantitative, Applied Analysis

Research output: Contributions to collected editions/worksChapterpeer-review

Standard

Climate Policy Cooperation Games between Developed and Developing Nations: A Quantitative, Applied Analysis. / Kemfert, Claudia.
The Coupling of Climate and Economic Dynamics: Essays on Integrated Assessment. ed. / Alain Haurie; Laurent Viguier. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2005. p. 145-171.

Research output: Contributions to collected editions/worksChapterpeer-review

Harvard

Kemfert, C 2005, Climate Policy Cooperation Games between Developed and Developing Nations: A Quantitative, Applied Analysis. in A Haurie & L Viguier (eds), The Coupling of Climate and Economic Dynamics: Essays on Integrated Assessment. Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht, pp. 145-171. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3425-3_6

APA

Kemfert, C. (2005). Climate Policy Cooperation Games between Developed and Developing Nations: A Quantitative, Applied Analysis. In A. Haurie, & L. Viguier (Eds.), The Coupling of Climate and Economic Dynamics: Essays on Integrated Assessment (pp. 145-171). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3425-3_6

Vancouver

Kemfert C. Climate Policy Cooperation Games between Developed and Developing Nations: A Quantitative, Applied Analysis. In Haurie A, Viguier L, editors, The Coupling of Climate and Economic Dynamics: Essays on Integrated Assessment. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. 2005. p. 145-171 doi: 10.1007/1-4020-3425-3_6

Bibtex

@inbook{59f481cc9a58490a96fc89e8f92f6719,
title = "Climate Policy Cooperation Games between Developed and Developing Nations: A Quantitative, Applied Analysis",
abstract = "This paper investigates climate control coalition games of developed and developing nations. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased RD expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries to join a climate control coalition if nations cooperate on technological innovations. Restrictions on trade such as sanction mechanisms against non-cooperating countries are not necessarily an incentive to join a coalition. Technological spillover effects lead to improved economic situations and increased energy efficiencies in non-cooperating countries. We compare climate control coalitions of developed and developing nations. Developing nations can benefit by climate control if it is linked with technology cooperation.",
keywords = "Economics, Emission Reduction, Emission Trading, Trade Barrier, Climate Control, Emission Permit",
author = "Claudia Kemfert",
year = "2005",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/1-4020-3425-3_6",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-90-481-6861-3",
pages = "145--171",
editor = "Alain Haurie and Laurent Viguier",
booktitle = "The Coupling of Climate and Economic Dynamics",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
address = "Netherlands",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Climate Policy Cooperation Games between Developed and Developing Nations

T2 - A Quantitative, Applied Analysis

AU - Kemfert, Claudia

PY - 2005/1/1

Y1 - 2005/1/1

N2 - This paper investigates climate control coalition games of developed and developing nations. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased RD expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries to join a climate control coalition if nations cooperate on technological innovations. Restrictions on trade such as sanction mechanisms against non-cooperating countries are not necessarily an incentive to join a coalition. Technological spillover effects lead to improved economic situations and increased energy efficiencies in non-cooperating countries. We compare climate control coalitions of developed and developing nations. Developing nations can benefit by climate control if it is linked with technology cooperation.

AB - This paper investigates climate control coalition games of developed and developing nations. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased RD expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries to join a climate control coalition if nations cooperate on technological innovations. Restrictions on trade such as sanction mechanisms against non-cooperating countries are not necessarily an incentive to join a coalition. Technological spillover effects lead to improved economic situations and increased energy efficiencies in non-cooperating countries. We compare climate control coalitions of developed and developing nations. Developing nations can benefit by climate control if it is linked with technology cooperation.

KW - Economics

KW - Emission Reduction

KW - Emission Trading

KW - Trade Barrier

KW - Climate Control

KW - Emission Permit

U2 - 10.1007/1-4020-3425-3_6

DO - 10.1007/1-4020-3425-3_6

M3 - Chapter

SN - 978-90-481-6861-3

SP - 145

EP - 171

BT - The Coupling of Climate and Economic Dynamics

A2 - Haurie, Alain

A2 - Viguier, Laurent

PB - Springer Netherlands

CY - Dordrecht

ER -

DOI