Climate coalitions and international trade: Assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage

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Climate coalitions and international trade: Assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage. / Kemfert, Claudia.
In: Energy Policy, Vol. 32, No. 4, 01.03.2004, p. 455-465.

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@article{13b96ecee35246039cf887a71a3c44c8,
title = "Climate coalitions and international trade: Assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage",
abstract = "This paper investigates climate control coalition games. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations like the USA to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased R&D expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries like the USA to join a climate control coalition if nations cooperate on technological innovations. Restrictions on trade such as sanction mechanisms against non-cooperating countries are not necessarily an incentive to join a coalition. Technological spillover effects lead to improved economic situations and increased energy efficiencies in non-cooperating countries.",
keywords = "Economics, Climate change policies, Coalition games, Induced technological change",
author = "Claudia Kemfert",
year = "2004",
month = mar,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/S0301-4215(03)00148-4",
language = "English",
volume = "32",
pages = "455--465",
journal = "Energy Policy",
issn = "0301-4215",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Climate coalitions and international trade

T2 - Assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage

AU - Kemfert, Claudia

PY - 2004/3/1

Y1 - 2004/3/1

N2 - This paper investigates climate control coalition games. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations like the USA to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased R&D expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries like the USA to join a climate control coalition if nations cooperate on technological innovations. Restrictions on trade such as sanction mechanisms against non-cooperating countries are not necessarily an incentive to join a coalition. Technological spillover effects lead to improved economic situations and increased energy efficiencies in non-cooperating countries.

AB - This paper investigates climate control coalition games. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations like the USA to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased R&D expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries like the USA to join a climate control coalition if nations cooperate on technological innovations. Restrictions on trade such as sanction mechanisms against non-cooperating countries are not necessarily an incentive to join a coalition. Technological spillover effects lead to improved economic situations and increased energy efficiencies in non-cooperating countries.

KW - Economics

KW - Climate change policies

KW - Coalition games

KW - Induced technological change

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0141889607&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/S0301-4215(03)00148-4

DO - 10.1016/S0301-4215(03)00148-4

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:0141889607

VL - 32

SP - 455

EP - 465

JO - Energy Policy

JF - Energy Policy

SN - 0301-4215

IS - 4

ER -