Climate coalitions and international trade: Assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
Standard
Climate coalitions and international trade : Assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage. / Kemfert, Claudia.
in: Energy Policy, Jahrgang 32, Nr. 4, 01.03.2004, S. 455-465.Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
Harvard
APA
Vancouver
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - Climate coalitions and international trade
T2 - Assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage
AU - Kemfert, Claudia
PY - 2004/3/1
Y1 - 2004/3/1
N2 - This paper investigates climate control coalition games. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations like the USA to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased R&D expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries like the USA to join a climate control coalition if nations cooperate on technological innovations. Restrictions on trade such as sanction mechanisms against non-cooperating countries are not necessarily an incentive to join a coalition. Technological spillover effects lead to improved economic situations and increased energy efficiencies in non-cooperating countries.
AB - This paper investigates climate control coalition games. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations like the USA to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased R&D expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries like the USA to join a climate control coalition if nations cooperate on technological innovations. Restrictions on trade such as sanction mechanisms against non-cooperating countries are not necessarily an incentive to join a coalition. Technological spillover effects lead to improved economic situations and increased energy efficiencies in non-cooperating countries.
KW - Economics
KW - Climate change policies
KW - Coalition games
KW - Induced technological change
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0141889607&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S0301-4215(03)00148-4
DO - 10.1016/S0301-4215(03)00148-4
M3 - Journal articles
AN - SCOPUS:0141889607
VL - 32
SP - 455
EP - 465
JO - Energy Policy
JF - Energy Policy
SN - 0301-4215
IS - 4
ER -