Works councils and separations: Voice, monopoly, and insurance effects

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Works councils and separations : Voice, monopoly, and insurance effects. / Hirsch, Boris; Schank, Thorsten; Schnabel, Claus.

in: Industrial Relations, Jahrgang 49, Nr. 4, 10.2010, S. 566-592.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Hirsch B, Schank T, Schnabel C. Works councils and separations: Voice, monopoly, and insurance effects. Industrial Relations. 2010 Okt;49(4):566-592. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-232X.2010.00617.x

Bibtex

@article{6400f4a0d36d457586e3192b66c0f787,
title = "Works councils and separations: Voice, monopoly, and insurance effects",
abstract = "Using a large linked employer-employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to nonemployment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than 2 years. Our results indicate that works councils to some extent represent the interests of a specific clientele.",
keywords = "Economics",
author = "Boris Hirsch and Thorsten Schank and Claus Schnabel",
year = "2010",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1111/j.1468-232X.2010.00617.x",
language = "English",
volume = "49",
pages = "566--592",
journal = "Industrial Relations",
issn = "0019-8676",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Works councils and separations

T2 - Voice, monopoly, and insurance effects

AU - Hirsch, Boris

AU - Schank, Thorsten

AU - Schnabel, Claus

PY - 2010/10

Y1 - 2010/10

N2 - Using a large linked employer-employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to nonemployment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than 2 years. Our results indicate that works councils to some extent represent the interests of a specific clientele.

AB - Using a large linked employer-employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to nonemployment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than 2 years. Our results indicate that works councils to some extent represent the interests of a specific clientele.

KW - Economics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77956239424&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-232X.2010.00617.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1468-232X.2010.00617.x

M3 - Journal articles

VL - 49

SP - 566

EP - 592

JO - Industrial Relations

JF - Industrial Relations

SN - 0019-8676

IS - 4

ER -

DOI