The termination of sanctions is an important but largely understudied phenomenon within international politics. Of the nearly 400 cases of sanctions that were in place in 1990 or imposed thereafter, nearly three-quarters had been lifted by 2018. As almost all existing research has focused on threatened and imposed sanctions, we lack insight into when and how these measures are lifted. This is particularly the case for sanctions that have been terminated despite targets resisting senders’ demands. To remedy this, we conceptualize the protracted process of sanctions termination and conduct an in-depth analysis of termination patterns of European Union, United Nations, United States and regional-organization sanctions in the post-Cold War era using the novel International Sanctions Termination (IST) dataset. We compare commonalities and differences between sanctions senders and assess how often and under what conditions targeted governments either give in to or resist their demands. Finally, we discuss how the material and signalling properties of sanctions may affect political contestation in the targeted country after these measures have ended.