Liberal democracy has been described as a ‘risky project’. Political forces in
the European Union such as Lega in Italy; the FPÖ in Austria; Rassemblement
National, or National Rally (known as the Front National, or the National Front,
until 2018) in France; the SDS in Slovenia; and the HDZ and the Homeland
Movement in Croatia reveal the fragility of the compromises of liberal democracy – and they also illustrate its precarious nature. Drawing on these case
studies, we trace the conjunctures of the involution of liberal democracy in
the EU in recent decades, which have created fertile ground for authoritarian
populism to thrive. We argue that the declining cohesive force of parties or
civil society organisations such as trade unions, the increasing disciplinary
pressures generated by a globalised world market and the limited prospect of
overcoming the authoritarianism of modern capitalist societies within liberal
democracy, opened the door for the successful mobilisation of anti-democratic
sentiments. Authoritarian populist forces in Austria, Croatia, France, Italy and
Slovenia have managed to reinforce the half-heartedly concealed hierarchical
structures of society. Their efforts to re-normalise inequality and authoritarianism not only pose a threat to the political participation and physical integrity
of minorities and subaltern groups; they also undermine basic principles of
liberal democracy, as deliberation is replaced by a putative homogeneous
‘will of the people’. The chapter concludes with a look at how their counterattack against previous achievements of emancipatory movements within the
confines of liberal democracy has played out in the COVID-19 pandemic. Given
the fairly dynamic nature of the current situation and the chaotic handling of
the health/social crisis, we stress that social movements and progressive
forces will be crucial in working towards a socially inclusive political alternative
that defends – and potentially transcends – the incomplete democratisation of
liberal democracy.