Regional Institutional Design

Publikation: Beiträge in SammelwerkenAufsätze in SammelwerkenForschungbegutachtet

Standard

Regional Institutional Design. / Lenz, Tobias; Marks, Gary.
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism . Hrsg. / Tanja A. Börzel; Thomas Risse. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. S. 513-537.

Publikation: Beiträge in SammelwerkenAufsätze in SammelwerkenForschungbegutachtet

Harvard

Lenz, T & Marks, G 2016, Regional Institutional Design. in TA Börzel & T Risse (Hrsg.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism . Oxford University Press, Oxford, S. 513-537. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199682300.013.23

APA

Lenz, T., & Marks, G. (2016). Regional Institutional Design. In T. A. Börzel, & T. Risse (Hrsg.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism (S. 513-537). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199682300.013.23

Vancouver

Lenz T, Marks G. Regional Institutional Design. in Börzel TA, Risse T, Hrsg., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016. S. 513-537 doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199682300.013.23

Bibtex

@inbook{116b18bae8e448318a0d5502575ffbe1,
title = "Regional Institutional Design",
abstract = "Regional organizations (ROs) display significant variation in their institutional design. Some have a diversified institutional architecture; others are fairly simple in their institutional organization. Some make decisions by consensus; others use majoritarian decision-making rules. Some appear to be relatively fixed in their institutional structure, while others change considerably over time. This chapter addresses three key questions related to the institutional design of ROs: What are the principal empirical patterns? How can design variation be explained? And how is it related to states{\textquoteright} ability to achieve collective goals? The chapter suggests that pooling and delegation capture distinct aspects of regional organization and examines how the literatures on realism, institutionalism, constructivism, and diffusion explain the variation that can be detected. The authors then review the consequences of institutional design for peace and security, economic welfare, domestic institutions, and international actorness. They conclude by discussing some promising avenues for future research.",
keywords = "Politics, reional organization, institutional design, pooling, delegation, realism, institutionalism, constructivism",
author = "Tobias Lenz and Gary Marks",
year = "2016",
month = feb,
doi = "10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199682300.013.23",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780199682300",
pages = "513--537",
editor = "B{\"o}rzel, {Tanja A.} and Thomas Risse",
booktitle = "The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
address = "United Kingdom",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Regional Institutional Design

AU - Lenz, Tobias

AU - Marks, Gary

PY - 2016/2

Y1 - 2016/2

N2 - Regional organizations (ROs) display significant variation in their institutional design. Some have a diversified institutional architecture; others are fairly simple in their institutional organization. Some make decisions by consensus; others use majoritarian decision-making rules. Some appear to be relatively fixed in their institutional structure, while others change considerably over time. This chapter addresses three key questions related to the institutional design of ROs: What are the principal empirical patterns? How can design variation be explained? And how is it related to states’ ability to achieve collective goals? The chapter suggests that pooling and delegation capture distinct aspects of regional organization and examines how the literatures on realism, institutionalism, constructivism, and diffusion explain the variation that can be detected. The authors then review the consequences of institutional design for peace and security, economic welfare, domestic institutions, and international actorness. They conclude by discussing some promising avenues for future research.

AB - Regional organizations (ROs) display significant variation in their institutional design. Some have a diversified institutional architecture; others are fairly simple in their institutional organization. Some make decisions by consensus; others use majoritarian decision-making rules. Some appear to be relatively fixed in their institutional structure, while others change considerably over time. This chapter addresses three key questions related to the institutional design of ROs: What are the principal empirical patterns? How can design variation be explained? And how is it related to states’ ability to achieve collective goals? The chapter suggests that pooling and delegation capture distinct aspects of regional organization and examines how the literatures on realism, institutionalism, constructivism, and diffusion explain the variation that can be detected. The authors then review the consequences of institutional design for peace and security, economic welfare, domestic institutions, and international actorness. They conclude by discussing some promising avenues for future research.

KW - Politics

KW - reional organization

KW - institutional design

KW - pooling

KW - delegation

KW - realism

KW - institutionalism

KW - constructivism

U2 - 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199682300.013.23

DO - 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199682300.013.23

M3 - Contributions to collected editions/anthologies

SN - 9780199682300

SP - 513

EP - 537

BT - The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism

A2 - Börzel, Tanja A.

A2 - Risse, Thomas

PB - Oxford University Press

CY - Oxford

ER -

DOI