TY - JOUR

T1 - Feste Benzinpreise für einen Tag - Mehr Preiswettbewerb durch die 24h-Regel

AU - Reindl, Andreas

AU - Wein, Thomas

PY - 2012/10

Y1 - 2012/10

N2 - The German Cartel Offi ce's recent study of retail gasoline markets provides strong evidence of an oligopoly in which the major suppliers coordinate pricing strategies and achieve supracompetitive prices. Competition law enforcement does not provide effective tools to improve market outcomes. We examine the potential benefits of a regulatory framework that would require gasoline suppliers to announce at a specified time their prices for the following day and prohibit price changes during a 24-hour period. Such a 24-hour rule could complicate coordination and lead to lower prices, although it cannot be ruled out that the oligopolists would adjust and develop new coordination strategies.

AB - The German Cartel Offi ce's recent study of retail gasoline markets provides strong evidence of an oligopoly in which the major suppliers coordinate pricing strategies and achieve supracompetitive prices. Competition law enforcement does not provide effective tools to improve market outcomes. We examine the potential benefits of a regulatory framework that would require gasoline suppliers to announce at a specified time their prices for the following day and prohibit price changes during a 24-hour period. Such a 24-hour rule could complicate coordination and lead to lower prices, although it cannot be ruled out that the oligopolists would adjust and develop new coordination strategies.

KW - Volkswirtschaftslehre

KW - Wettbewerb

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84869424522&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10273-012-1438-4

DO - 10.1007/s10273-012-1438-4

M3 - Zeitschriftenaufsätze

VL - 92

SP - 678

EP - 686

JO - Wirtschaftsdienst

JF - Wirtschaftsdienst

SN - 0043-6275

IS - 10

ER -