Employment service: Public or private?

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Employment service : Public or private? / Zweifel, Peter; Zaborowski, Christoph.

in: Public Choice, Jahrgang 89, Nr. 1-2, 01.10.1996, S. 131-162.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Zweifel P, Zaborowski C. Employment service: Public or private? Public Choice. 1996 Okt 1;89(1-2):131-162. doi: 10.1007/BF00114283

Bibtex

@article{813f50fa8f514c4784af000e6b16c190,
title = "Employment service: Public or private?",
abstract = "This paper deals with the relative performance of private and public employment services. For this purpose, two behavioral models are developed which take into account that private and and public employment agents not only pursue different aims but also face different restrictions, in particular since a public employment agency lacks the right to reject applicants. While analysis of the necessary optimality conditions yields tentative conclusions about the advantages and disadvantages of both types of employment service, empirically testable hypotheses result from the predicted responses to increases in unemployment and in the cost of service, respectively. These predicted behaviors are likely to be considered unfair by society, causing dissatisfaction with both private and public employment agencies.",
keywords = "Economics",
author = "Peter Zweifel and Christoph Zaborowski",
year = "1996",
month = oct,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/BF00114283",
language = "English",
volume = "89",
pages = "131--162",
journal = "Public Choice",
issn = "0048-5829",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "1-2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Employment service

T2 - Public or private?

AU - Zweifel, Peter

AU - Zaborowski, Christoph

PY - 1996/10/1

Y1 - 1996/10/1

N2 - This paper deals with the relative performance of private and public employment services. For this purpose, two behavioral models are developed which take into account that private and and public employment agents not only pursue different aims but also face different restrictions, in particular since a public employment agency lacks the right to reject applicants. While analysis of the necessary optimality conditions yields tentative conclusions about the advantages and disadvantages of both types of employment service, empirically testable hypotheses result from the predicted responses to increases in unemployment and in the cost of service, respectively. These predicted behaviors are likely to be considered unfair by society, causing dissatisfaction with both private and public employment agencies.

AB - This paper deals with the relative performance of private and public employment services. For this purpose, two behavioral models are developed which take into account that private and and public employment agents not only pursue different aims but also face different restrictions, in particular since a public employment agency lacks the right to reject applicants. While analysis of the necessary optimality conditions yields tentative conclusions about the advantages and disadvantages of both types of employment service, empirically testable hypotheses result from the predicted responses to increases in unemployment and in the cost of service, respectively. These predicted behaviors are likely to be considered unfair by society, causing dissatisfaction with both private and public employment agencies.

KW - Economics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=21444433774&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/8d1bc965-a6c4-3c1e-aa60-258129c91f85/

U2 - 10.1007/BF00114283

DO - 10.1007/BF00114283

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:21444433774

VL - 89

SP - 131

EP - 162

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

SN - 0048-5829

IS - 1-2

ER -

DOI