Corruption and Electoral Support for New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
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in: West European Politics, Jahrgang 39, Nr. 2, 03.03.2016, S. 278-304.
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Corruption and Electoral Support for New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe
AU - Engler, Sarah
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2015 Taylor & Francis.
PY - 2016/3/3
Y1 - 2016/3/3
N2 - More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This article examines corruption as a potential determinant of their electoral support. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: on the one hand, the historically derived corruption level reduces the electoral support for new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase in perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral support for new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2013 confirms these two counteracting effects.
AB - More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This article examines corruption as a potential determinant of their electoral support. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: on the one hand, the historically derived corruption level reduces the electoral support for new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase in perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral support for new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2013 confirms these two counteracting effects.
KW - Central and Eastern Europe
KW - clientelism
KW - corruption
KW - new political parties
KW - party–voter linkages
KW - volatility
KW - Politics
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84957725767&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/01402382.2015.1084127
DO - 10.1080/01402382.2015.1084127
M3 - Journal articles
AN - SCOPUS:84957725767
VL - 39
SP - 278
EP - 304
JO - West European Politics
JF - West European Politics
SN - 0140-2382
IS - 2
ER -