Conjectural variations equilibrium in a mixed duopoly

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Conjectural variations equilibrium in a mixed duopoly. / Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav; Kemfert, Claudia; Kalashnikov, Vitaly.

in: European Journal of Operational Research , Jahrgang 192, Nr. 3, 01.02.2009, S. 717-729.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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@article{643a5ce7dc614c5ea3619f70ed232016,
title = "Conjectural variations equilibrium in a mixed duopoly",
abstract = "We study a mixed duopoly model, in which a state-owned (public) firm maximizing domestic social surplus and a private (foreign) firm compete. Under general enough assumptions, we first justify the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE) applied to the model by demonstrating concavity of the expected profit function of each agent. Next we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium in the described duopoly. A particular case of a CVE with constant influence (conjecture) coefficients is also examined.",
keywords = "Conjectural variations equilibrium, Constant influence coefficients, Mixed duopoly, Economics",
author = "Vyacheslav Kalashnikov and Claudia Kemfert and Vitaly Kalashnikov",
year = "2009",
month = feb,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.ejor.2007.09.020",
language = "English",
volume = "192",
pages = "717--729",
journal = "European Journal of Operational Research",
issn = "0377-2217",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Conjectural variations equilibrium in a mixed duopoly

AU - Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav

AU - Kemfert, Claudia

AU - Kalashnikov, Vitaly

PY - 2009/2/1

Y1 - 2009/2/1

N2 - We study a mixed duopoly model, in which a state-owned (public) firm maximizing domestic social surplus and a private (foreign) firm compete. Under general enough assumptions, we first justify the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE) applied to the model by demonstrating concavity of the expected profit function of each agent. Next we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium in the described duopoly. A particular case of a CVE with constant influence (conjecture) coefficients is also examined.

AB - We study a mixed duopoly model, in which a state-owned (public) firm maximizing domestic social surplus and a private (foreign) firm compete. Under general enough assumptions, we first justify the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE) applied to the model by demonstrating concavity of the expected profit function of each agent. Next we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium in the described duopoly. A particular case of a CVE with constant influence (conjecture) coefficients is also examined.

KW - Conjectural variations equilibrium

KW - Constant influence coefficients

KW - Mixed duopoly

KW - Economics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=51649109643&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2007.09.020

DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2007.09.020

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:51649109643

VL - 192

SP - 717

EP - 729

JO - European Journal of Operational Research

JF - European Journal of Operational Research

SN - 0377-2217

IS - 3

ER -

DOI