TY - JOUR

T1 - Works councils, union bargaining and quits in German firms

AU - Pfeifer, Christian

N1 - Published online October 2010

PY - 2011/5

Y1 - 2011/5

N2 - Unsatisfied employees are likely to quit their current job if they have a better outside option. Worker codetermination and union bargaining might increase employees’ utility and make quits unnecessary. The article offers econometric evidence from a large-scale German establishment data set supporting the view that works councils, firm-level and industry-level union bargained collective agreements reduce the number of quits. Moreover, a strong interaction effect between both institutions exists. The results are robust for different subsamples and econometric methods.

AB - Unsatisfied employees are likely to quit their current job if they have a better outside option. Worker codetermination and union bargaining might increase employees’ utility and make quits unnecessary. The article offers econometric evidence from a large-scale German establishment data set supporting the view that works councils, firm-level and industry-level union bargained collective agreements reduce the number of quits. Moreover, a strong interaction effect between both institutions exists. The results are robust for different subsamples and econometric methods.

KW - Economics

KW - codetermination

KW - exit-voice

KW - job satisfaction

KW - union

KW - voluntary turnover

KW - works council

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79955111947&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1177/0143831X10377806

DO - 10.1177/0143831X10377806

M3 - Journal articles

VL - 32

SP - 243

EP - 260

JO - Economic and Industrial Democracy

JF - Economic and Industrial Democracy

SN - 0143-831X

IS - 2

ER -