The Non-Ratification Scenario: Legal and Practical Responses to Mixed Treaty Rejection by Member States
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In: European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2018, p. 21-40.
Research output: Journal contributions › Scientific review articles › Research
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The Non-Ratification Scenario: Legal and Practical Responses to Mixed Treaty Rejection by Member States
AU - Kübek, Gesa
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - The near-death of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) painfully illustrated that the conclusion mixed agreements, i.e. agreements that list the EU, its Member States and a third party as contractors, may be derailed by a negative vote of (sub-)national decision-makers. Such a non-ratification entails a problematic conundrum: Despite the requirement for national ratification under international law, a Member State violates the EU’s legal principles of conferral and loyal cooperation when vetoing a mixed treaty in its entirety. The present article argues that the Member States are not competent to reject the EU exclusive parts of a mixed treaty in their own right. It suggests that the EU’s and the Member States’ legal authority to ratify mixed agreements is contingent on who owns and who exercises treaty-making power for substantive components and outlines several practical ways to align national (non-)ratification with the EU’s law on competences and procedure.
AB - The near-death of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) painfully illustrated that the conclusion mixed agreements, i.e. agreements that list the EU, its Member States and a third party as contractors, may be derailed by a negative vote of (sub-)national decision-makers. Such a non-ratification entails a problematic conundrum: Despite the requirement for national ratification under international law, a Member State violates the EU’s legal principles of conferral and loyal cooperation when vetoing a mixed treaty in its entirety. The present article argues that the Member States are not competent to reject the EU exclusive parts of a mixed treaty in their own right. It suggests that the EU’s and the Member States’ legal authority to ratify mixed agreements is contingent on who owns and who exercises treaty-making power for substantive components and outlines several practical ways to align national (non-)ratification with the EU’s law on competences and procedure.
KW - Law
UR - http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=EERR2018002
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85045684320&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Scientific review articles
VL - 23
SP - 21
EP - 40
JO - European Foreign Affairs Review
JF - European Foreign Affairs Review
SN - 1384-6299
IS - 1
ER -