Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting
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In: Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 24, No. 13, 29.07.2017, p. 902-905.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting
AU - Baumann, Florian
AU - Buchwald, Achim
AU - Friehe, Tim
AU - Hottenrott, Hanna
AU - Weche Gelübcke, John Philipp
PY - 2017/7/29
Y1 - 2017/7/29
N2 - We present empirical evidence suggesting that weak tax enforcement proxied by the extent of tax evasion in a country acts like a lower corporate tax rate in attracting profits of multinational corporations.
AB - We present empirical evidence suggesting that weak tax enforcement proxied by the extent of tax evasion in a country acts like a lower corporate tax rate in attracting profits of multinational corporations.
KW - Economics
KW - corporate taxes
KW - profit shifting
KW - Tax avoidance
KW - tax evasion
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84992170507&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/13504851.2016.1240331
DO - 10.1080/13504851.2016.1240331
M3 - Journal articles
AN - SCOPUS:84992170507
VL - 24
SP - 902
EP - 905
JO - Applied Economics Letters
JF - Applied Economics Letters
SN - 1350-4851
IS - 13
ER -