State-Building and the European Union's Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus: Why Legitimacy Matters
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In: Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions , Vol. 27, No. 4, 10.2014, p. 613-634.
Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - State-Building and the European Union's Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus
T2 - Why Legitimacy Matters
AU - Börzel, Tanja A.
AU - van Hüllen, Vera
PY - 2014/10
Y1 - 2014/10
N2 - This article asks under which conditions the state-building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International efforts need to resonate with prevalent social norms. To substantiate this argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anticorruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anticorruption programs as an instrument against political opponents, using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, was the fight against corruption facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anticorruption policies that added pressure on political elites "from below."
AB - This article asks under which conditions the state-building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International efforts need to resonate with prevalent social norms. To substantiate this argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anticorruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anticorruption programs as an instrument against political opponents, using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, was the fight against corruption facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anticorruption policies that added pressure on political elites "from below."
KW - Politics
U2 - 10.1111/gove.12068
DO - 10.1111/gove.12068
M3 - Journal articles
VL - 27
SP - 613
EP - 634
JO - Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions
JF - Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions
SN - 1468-0491
IS - 4
ER -