TY - JOUR

T1 - Philosophical Bases for Self-determination in Criminal Law

AU - Magnus, Dorothea

PY - 2018/7

Y1 - 2018/7

N2 - Criminal law operates under the assumption that persons have the capacity for free, voluntary choice. However, since the concept of free will and self-determination may be understood in a variety of ways, it must be made the subject of philosophical scrutiny if it is to provide a solid foundation for law. This paper will present two major philosophical concepts of self-determination and evaluate their utility for criminal law. The conclusion delineates the possibilities and limitations of these concepts when applied in particular to the field of criminal law.

AB - Criminal law operates under the assumption that persons have the capacity for free, voluntary choice. However, since the concept of free will and self-determination may be understood in a variety of ways, it must be made the subject of philosophical scrutiny if it is to provide a solid foundation for law. This paper will present two major philosophical concepts of self-determination and evaluate their utility for criminal law. The conclusion delineates the possibilities and limitations of these concepts when applied in particular to the field of criminal law.

KW - Law

KW - Autonomy of person

KW - criminal law

KW - moral freedom

KW - criminal liability

KW - philosophical approaches to self-determination

KW - criteria of autonomy

KW - Autonomie der Person

KW - Strafrecht

KW - moralische Freiheit

KW - strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit

KW - philosophische Konzepte zur Selbstbestimmung

KW - Kriterien für Autonomie

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85053297384&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.25162/arsp-2018-0023

DO - 10.25162/arsp-2018-0023

M3 - Scientific review articles

VL - 104

SP - 421

EP - 432

JO - Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie

JF - Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie

SN - 0001-2343

IS - 3

ER -