Parliaments in time: The evolution of legislative democracy in Western Europe, 1866-2015

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Parliaments in time: The evolution of legislative democracy in Western Europe, 1866-2015. / Koß, Michael.
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 306 p.

Research output: Books and anthologiesMonographsResearch

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Koß M. Parliaments in time: The evolution of legislative democracy in Western Europe, 1866-2015. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 306 p. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198766919.001.0001

Bibtex

@book{26c15578660548069c8703b8dd0fde26,
title = "Parliaments in time: The evolution of legislative democracy in Western Europe, 1866-2015",
abstract = "This book sheds light on the institutional development of four (emerging) Western European parliaments. Parliaments in Western Europe are noteworthy for several reasons. Their institutional designs differ remarkably, with distinct consequences for their policy output. Scholars have diagnosed the decline of legislatures for over a century now. Based on a model of distributive bargaining over legislative procedures, this book engages in a comparative process-tracing analysis of ninety reforms, which restructured control over the plenary agenda and committee power in Britain, France, Sweden, and Germany between 1866 and 2015. The analysis presented suggests that legislators in Western Europe rationalize procedures as a response to growing levels of legislative workload. As a consequence, legislatures evolve towards one of two procedural ideal types: talking or working legislatures. In talking legislatures, governments enjoy privileges in legislative agenda-setting (resulting in centralized agenda control) and committees are weak. In contrast, working legislatures combine decentralized agenda control with powerful committees. Which path legislators chose is determined by the appearance of anti-system obstruction. If anti-system parties obstruct legislative business, legislators surrender ancient procedural privileges and agree to a centralization of agenda control. Otherwise, their demand for legislative mega-seats on committees triggers the evolution of working legislatures. If legislators fail to respond to an anti-system threat, legislative procedures break down. For this reason, the central aim of procedural reforms in Western European parliaments is to maintain legislative democracy. Rather than a decline of legislatures, for talking legislatures to successfully overcome an anti-system threat indicates the resilience of legislative democracy.",
keywords = "Agenda control, Anti-system parties, Committee power, Distributive bargaining, Legislative obstruction, Legislatures, Longitudinal comparison, Political parties, Process-tracing analysis, Western Europe, Politics",
author = "Michael Ko{\ss}",
year = "2018",
month = dec,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1093/oso/9780198766919.001.0001",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780198766919",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
address = "United Kingdom",

}

RIS

TY - BOOK

T1 - Parliaments in time

T2 - The evolution of legislative democracy in Western Europe, 1866-2015

AU - Koß, Michael

PY - 2018/12/1

Y1 - 2018/12/1

N2 - This book sheds light on the institutional development of four (emerging) Western European parliaments. Parliaments in Western Europe are noteworthy for several reasons. Their institutional designs differ remarkably, with distinct consequences for their policy output. Scholars have diagnosed the decline of legislatures for over a century now. Based on a model of distributive bargaining over legislative procedures, this book engages in a comparative process-tracing analysis of ninety reforms, which restructured control over the plenary agenda and committee power in Britain, France, Sweden, and Germany between 1866 and 2015. The analysis presented suggests that legislators in Western Europe rationalize procedures as a response to growing levels of legislative workload. As a consequence, legislatures evolve towards one of two procedural ideal types: talking or working legislatures. In talking legislatures, governments enjoy privileges in legislative agenda-setting (resulting in centralized agenda control) and committees are weak. In contrast, working legislatures combine decentralized agenda control with powerful committees. Which path legislators chose is determined by the appearance of anti-system obstruction. If anti-system parties obstruct legislative business, legislators surrender ancient procedural privileges and agree to a centralization of agenda control. Otherwise, their demand for legislative mega-seats on committees triggers the evolution of working legislatures. If legislators fail to respond to an anti-system threat, legislative procedures break down. For this reason, the central aim of procedural reforms in Western European parliaments is to maintain legislative democracy. Rather than a decline of legislatures, for talking legislatures to successfully overcome an anti-system threat indicates the resilience of legislative democracy.

AB - This book sheds light on the institutional development of four (emerging) Western European parliaments. Parliaments in Western Europe are noteworthy for several reasons. Their institutional designs differ remarkably, with distinct consequences for their policy output. Scholars have diagnosed the decline of legislatures for over a century now. Based on a model of distributive bargaining over legislative procedures, this book engages in a comparative process-tracing analysis of ninety reforms, which restructured control over the plenary agenda and committee power in Britain, France, Sweden, and Germany between 1866 and 2015. The analysis presented suggests that legislators in Western Europe rationalize procedures as a response to growing levels of legislative workload. As a consequence, legislatures evolve towards one of two procedural ideal types: talking or working legislatures. In talking legislatures, governments enjoy privileges in legislative agenda-setting (resulting in centralized agenda control) and committees are weak. In contrast, working legislatures combine decentralized agenda control with powerful committees. Which path legislators chose is determined by the appearance of anti-system obstruction. If anti-system parties obstruct legislative business, legislators surrender ancient procedural privileges and agree to a centralization of agenda control. Otherwise, their demand for legislative mega-seats on committees triggers the evolution of working legislatures. If legislators fail to respond to an anti-system threat, legislative procedures break down. For this reason, the central aim of procedural reforms in Western European parliaments is to maintain legislative democracy. Rather than a decline of legislatures, for talking legislatures to successfully overcome an anti-system threat indicates the resilience of legislative democracy.

KW - Agenda control

KW - Anti-system parties

KW - Committee power

KW - Distributive bargaining

KW - Legislative obstruction

KW - Legislatures

KW - Longitudinal comparison

KW - Political parties

KW - Process-tracing analysis

KW - Western Europe

KW - Politics

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U2 - 10.1093/oso/9780198766919.001.0001

DO - 10.1093/oso/9780198766919.001.0001

M3 - Monographs

AN - SCOPUS:85054715103

SN - 9780198766919

SN - 0198766912

BT - Parliaments in time

PB - Oxford University Press

CY - Oxford, New York

ER -