Inflation and Deflationary Biases in Inflation Expectations
Research output: Working paper › Working papers
Authors
We explore the consequences of losing confidence in the price-stability objective of central banks by quantifying the inflation and deflationary biases in inflation expectations. In a model with an occasionally binding zero-lower-bound constraint, we show that both inflation bias and deflationary bias can exist as a steady-state outcome. We assess the predictions of this model using unique individual-level inflation expectations data across nine countries that allow for a direct identification of these biases. Both inflation and deflationary biases are present and sizable, but different across countries. Even among the euro-area countries, perceptions of the European Central Bank’s objectives are very distinct.
Original language | English |
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Place of Publication | Washington DC |
Publisher | Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US) |
Number of pages | 51 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 06.2019 |
Externally published | Yes |
- Economics - inflation bias, deflationary bias, confidence in central banks, trust, ZLB, inflation expectations, microdata