Incentives Matter, But What Do They Mean? Understanding the Meaning of Market Coordination

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Incentives Matter, But What Do They Mean? Understanding the Meaning of Market Coordination. / Dekker, Erwin ; Remic, Blaz; Dalla Chiesa, Carolina.
In: Review of Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 2, 02.04.2020, p. 163-179.

Research output: Journal contributionsJournal articlesResearchpeer-review

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@article{60604bba04954fdc8829de3d11c9d4f7,
title = "Incentives Matter, But What Do They Mean? Understanding the Meaning of Market Coordination",
abstract = "This article argues that the discussion of incentives in economics neglects a crucial question: why are some incentives felt as powerful reasons to alter actions, while other incentives have little, or even counterproductive, effect? We argue that an answer to this question can be found in recent empirical work in economic sociology, institutional economics and Austrian economics. This work studies the meaning of incentives in particular social settings and shows that incentives become meaningful in relation to those settings. We demonstrate that it illuminates why certain incentives are perceived as powerful reasons for action, while others are mostly ignored. We also explain why incentives are typically tied to certain social roles that can be identified through ideal-type analysis, and why situations of high uncertainty are of particular use for studying the activity of actors. In order to understand entrepreneurial action, financial markets, and why monetary rewards and market exchange are sometimes perceived as the wrong type of incentive, research should focus on how an uncertain future is understood by actors. We identify four building blocks in the work of Alfred Schutz, and suggest they yield a constructive research program at the intersection between economics and sociology.",
keywords = "Sociology, incentives, corrdination, schutz, economic sociology, Economics",
author = "Erwin Dekker and Blaz Remic and {Dalla Chiesa}, Carolina",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.",
year = "2020",
month = apr,
day = "2",
doi = "10.1080/09538259.2019.1628341",
language = "English",
volume = "32",
pages = "163--179",
journal = "Review of Political Economy",
issn = "0953-8259",
publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Incentives Matter, But What Do They Mean? Understanding the Meaning of Market Coordination

AU - Dekker, Erwin

AU - Remic, Blaz

AU - Dalla Chiesa, Carolina

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

PY - 2020/4/2

Y1 - 2020/4/2

N2 - This article argues that the discussion of incentives in economics neglects a crucial question: why are some incentives felt as powerful reasons to alter actions, while other incentives have little, or even counterproductive, effect? We argue that an answer to this question can be found in recent empirical work in economic sociology, institutional economics and Austrian economics. This work studies the meaning of incentives in particular social settings and shows that incentives become meaningful in relation to those settings. We demonstrate that it illuminates why certain incentives are perceived as powerful reasons for action, while others are mostly ignored. We also explain why incentives are typically tied to certain social roles that can be identified through ideal-type analysis, and why situations of high uncertainty are of particular use for studying the activity of actors. In order to understand entrepreneurial action, financial markets, and why monetary rewards and market exchange are sometimes perceived as the wrong type of incentive, research should focus on how an uncertain future is understood by actors. We identify four building blocks in the work of Alfred Schutz, and suggest they yield a constructive research program at the intersection between economics and sociology.

AB - This article argues that the discussion of incentives in economics neglects a crucial question: why are some incentives felt as powerful reasons to alter actions, while other incentives have little, or even counterproductive, effect? We argue that an answer to this question can be found in recent empirical work in economic sociology, institutional economics and Austrian economics. This work studies the meaning of incentives in particular social settings and shows that incentives become meaningful in relation to those settings. We demonstrate that it illuminates why certain incentives are perceived as powerful reasons for action, while others are mostly ignored. We also explain why incentives are typically tied to certain social roles that can be identified through ideal-type analysis, and why situations of high uncertainty are of particular use for studying the activity of actors. In order to understand entrepreneurial action, financial markets, and why monetary rewards and market exchange are sometimes perceived as the wrong type of incentive, research should focus on how an uncertain future is understood by actors. We identify four building blocks in the work of Alfred Schutz, and suggest they yield a constructive research program at the intersection between economics and sociology.

KW - Sociology

KW - incentives

KW - corrdination

KW - schutz

KW - economic sociology

KW - Economics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85072073004&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/09538259.2019.1628341

DO - 10.1080/09538259.2019.1628341

M3 - Journal articles

VL - 32

SP - 163

EP - 179

JO - Review of Political Economy

JF - Review of Political Economy

SN - 0953-8259

IS - 2

ER -