TY - JOUR

T1 - Grist to the mill of subversion

T2 - strikes and coups in counterinsurgencies

AU - Gläßel, Christian

AU - González, Belén

AU - Scharpf, Adam

N1 - The author(s) received financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The authors acknowledge financial support from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant 336019 and the University of Mannheim’s Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences.

PY - 2020/12/1

Y1 - 2020/12/1

N2 - Why are acts of organized resistance associated with coups? Inspired by the Arab Spring, a large literature suggests that militaries confronted with civil resistance tend to side with protesters and oust their government. In the historically most coup-prone environment of insurgencies, however, alliances between the military and protesters are implausible because soldiers suspect insurgents behind social dissent. Disentangling different types of resistance, this article analyzes whether and how strikes, demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks affect the military’s disposition and ability to stage a coup during counterinsurgencies. We argue that only strikes trigger coup attempts. Soldiers interpret strikes as manifestations of a strengthening subversive enemy that threatens their victory over insurgents, while economic elites support a coup in the hope that the military will terminate costly walkouts. This interest alignment fosters military takeovers. We provide case-study evidence from Cold War Argentina and Venezuela to show our suggested mechanism at work. Demonstrating the scope of our argument, we quantitatively analyze coup attempts in counterinsurgency worldwide (1950–2005). Results show that strikes increase wartime coup risk, whereas demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks do not. The findings highlight the backfiring potential of nonviolent resistance with important implications for post-coup political orders and democratization prospects.

AB - Why are acts of organized resistance associated with coups? Inspired by the Arab Spring, a large literature suggests that militaries confronted with civil resistance tend to side with protesters and oust their government. In the historically most coup-prone environment of insurgencies, however, alliances between the military and protesters are implausible because soldiers suspect insurgents behind social dissent. Disentangling different types of resistance, this article analyzes whether and how strikes, demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks affect the military’s disposition and ability to stage a coup during counterinsurgencies. We argue that only strikes trigger coup attempts. Soldiers interpret strikes as manifestations of a strengthening subversive enemy that threatens their victory over insurgents, while economic elites support a coup in the hope that the military will terminate costly walkouts. This interest alignment fosters military takeovers. We provide case-study evidence from Cold War Argentina and Venezuela to show our suggested mechanism at work. Demonstrating the scope of our argument, we quantitatively analyze coup attempts in counterinsurgency worldwide (1950–2005). Results show that strikes increase wartime coup risk, whereas demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks do not. The findings highlight the backfiring potential of nonviolent resistance with important implications for post-coup political orders and democratization prospects.

KW - Politics

KW - Argentina

KW - bureaucratic authoritarianism

KW - elite collusion

KW - Military coup

KW - nonviolent resistance

KW - Venezuela

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85085380889&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/7784f3df-557d-3e7c-bb5c-1e7d51380512/

U2 - 10.1177/1354066120923028

DO - 10.1177/1354066120923028

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:85085380889

VL - 26

SP - 1032

EP - 1060

JO - European Journal of International Relations

JF - European Journal of International Relations

SN - 1354-0661

IS - 4

ER -