Conjectural variations equilibrium in a mixed duopoly

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We study a mixed duopoly model, in which a state-owned (public) firm maximizing domestic social surplus and a private (foreign) firm compete. Under general enough assumptions, we first justify the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE) applied to the model by demonstrating concavity of the expected profit function of each agent. Next we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium in the described duopoly. A particular case of a CVE with constant influence (conjecture) coefficients is also examined.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Issue number3
Pages (from-to)717-729
Number of pages13
Publication statusPublished - 01.02.2009
Externally publishedYes

    Research areas

  • Conjectural variations equilibrium, Constant influence coefficients, Mixed duopoly
  • Economics