Bureaucracy, tax system, and economic performance

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Bureaucracy, tax system, and economic performance. / Ott, Ingrid.
In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 8, No. 5, 01.12.2006, p. 839-862.

Research output: Journal contributionsJournal articlesResearchpeer-review

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Ott I. Bureaucracy, tax system, and economic performance. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2006 Dec 1;8(5):839-862. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00291.x

Bibtex

@article{cf2b794570e24a1c8fb427a7f77abe58,
title = "Bureaucracy, tax system, and economic performance",
abstract = "This paper investigates the consequences for government size, growth and welfare if a selfish bureaucracy provides a congested input. Alternative exogenous tax systems are introduced and numerical analyses are carried out. The welfare optimum is only met under very specific assumptions: proportional congestion, a tax system only consisting of distortionary taxes and a bureaucracy that maximizes the budget's growth rate. Otherwise the relative size of the public sector becomes suboptimally large thus inducing welfare losses. From a welfare economic point of view bureaucratic selfishness is worse than a suboptimal taxing regime that does not (completely) internalize the congestion externalities.",
keywords = "Economics",
author = "Ingrid Ott",
year = "2006",
month = dec,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00291.x",
language = "English",
volume = "8",
pages = "839--862",
journal = "Journal of Public Economic Theory",
issn = "1097-3923",
publisher = "Wiley Periodicals, LLC.",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Bureaucracy, tax system, and economic performance

AU - Ott, Ingrid

PY - 2006/12/1

Y1 - 2006/12/1

N2 - This paper investigates the consequences for government size, growth and welfare if a selfish bureaucracy provides a congested input. Alternative exogenous tax systems are introduced and numerical analyses are carried out. The welfare optimum is only met under very specific assumptions: proportional congestion, a tax system only consisting of distortionary taxes and a bureaucracy that maximizes the budget's growth rate. Otherwise the relative size of the public sector becomes suboptimally large thus inducing welfare losses. From a welfare economic point of view bureaucratic selfishness is worse than a suboptimal taxing regime that does not (completely) internalize the congestion externalities.

AB - This paper investigates the consequences for government size, growth and welfare if a selfish bureaucracy provides a congested input. Alternative exogenous tax systems are introduced and numerical analyses are carried out. The welfare optimum is only met under very specific assumptions: proportional congestion, a tax system only consisting of distortionary taxes and a bureaucracy that maximizes the budget's growth rate. Otherwise the relative size of the public sector becomes suboptimally large thus inducing welfare losses. From a welfare economic point of view bureaucratic selfishness is worse than a suboptimal taxing regime that does not (completely) internalize the congestion externalities.

KW - Economics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84892647131&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/d16d9388-6acc-31f6-afcd-42ed1a2520a9/

U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00291.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00291.x

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:84892647131

VL - 8

SP - 839

EP - 862

JO - Journal of Public Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory

SN - 1097-3923

IS - 5

ER -