The power politics of international tax co-operation: Luxembourg, Austria and the automatic exchange of information

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The power politics of international tax co-operation: Luxembourg, Austria and the automatic exchange of information. / Hakelberg, Lukas.
in: Journal of European Public Policy, Jahrgang 22, Nr. 3, 16.03.2015, S. 409-428.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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@article{c82fc2f657ee41a7b308f9ec98c1cfcc,
title = "The power politics of international tax co-operation: Luxembourg, Austria and the automatic exchange of information",
abstract = "Luxembourg and Austria resisted exchanging bank data on non-resident interest income with European Union (EU) partners for over a decade. In March 2014 they eventually gave in. Theories of tax competition analysts usually apply to intra-EU bargaining over taxation cannot explain their change of tack. Instead, I argue that American imposition of bilateral exchange of information on the two countries unlocked negotiations at EU level. Concessions made to the United States (US) by Luxembourg and Austria activated a most-favoured nation clause contained in an EU directive. Moreover, the US also forced third countries to exchange bank data, thus reducing the risk of capital flight from Luxembourg and Austria.",
keywords = "EU politics, FATCA, international political economy, power politics, savings directive, tax competition, Politics",
author = "Lukas Hakelberg",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2014, {\textcopyright} 2014 Taylor & Francis.",
year = "2015",
month = mar,
day = "16",
doi = "10.1080/13501763.2014.941380",
language = "English",
volume = "22",
pages = "409--428",
journal = "Journal of European Public Policy",
issn = "1350-1763",
publisher = "Routledge Taylor & Francis Group",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The power politics of international tax co-operation

T2 - Luxembourg, Austria and the automatic exchange of information

AU - Hakelberg, Lukas

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2014, © 2014 Taylor & Francis.

PY - 2015/3/16

Y1 - 2015/3/16

N2 - Luxembourg and Austria resisted exchanging bank data on non-resident interest income with European Union (EU) partners for over a decade. In March 2014 they eventually gave in. Theories of tax competition analysts usually apply to intra-EU bargaining over taxation cannot explain their change of tack. Instead, I argue that American imposition of bilateral exchange of information on the two countries unlocked negotiations at EU level. Concessions made to the United States (US) by Luxembourg and Austria activated a most-favoured nation clause contained in an EU directive. Moreover, the US also forced third countries to exchange bank data, thus reducing the risk of capital flight from Luxembourg and Austria.

AB - Luxembourg and Austria resisted exchanging bank data on non-resident interest income with European Union (EU) partners for over a decade. In March 2014 they eventually gave in. Theories of tax competition analysts usually apply to intra-EU bargaining over taxation cannot explain their change of tack. Instead, I argue that American imposition of bilateral exchange of information on the two countries unlocked negotiations at EU level. Concessions made to the United States (US) by Luxembourg and Austria activated a most-favoured nation clause contained in an EU directive. Moreover, the US also forced third countries to exchange bank data, thus reducing the risk of capital flight from Luxembourg and Austria.

KW - EU politics

KW - FATCA

KW - international political economy

KW - power politics

KW - savings directive

KW - tax competition

KW - Politics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84924853427&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2014.941380

DO - 10.1080/13501763.2014.941380

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:84924853427

VL - 22

SP - 409

EP - 428

JO - Journal of European Public Policy

JF - Journal of European Public Policy

SN - 1350-1763

IS - 3

ER -

DOI