In this paper, I experimentally investigate couples’ specialization decisions and examine the gender-specific patterns in labor division arising within heterosexual couples. Eighty participants—20 real couples and 20 pairs of strangers—play a two-stage game, paired up either with their partner or a stranger of the opposite sex. In the first stage, participants make a joint decision on how to play the game: They can both complete a performance-based paid task (task A) or have one of the players perform an unpaid task (task B), thereby tripling the pay-rate for the partner playing task A. After completing their tasks, participants are informed about their pay-offs in private and then asked to make an individual decision about what proportion of their income to pay into a common pool, where it is increased by 20 % and distributed equally between the two players. I find that women are significantly more likely to give up their income autonomy and perform the unpaid task when playing with their partner rather than with an unfamiliar man. Men’s behavior is not affected by familiarity with their female partner.